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ARTICLES
SHAREHOLDER VOTING IN AN AGE OF
INTERMEDIARY CAPITALISM
PAUL H. EDELMAN*
RANDALL S. THOMASt
ROBERT B. THOMPSONI

INTRODUCTION
Shareholder voting, once given up for dead as "a vestige or ritual of
little practical importance,"' has come roaring back as a key part of
American corporate governance. Where once voting was limited to
uncontested annual election of directors, it is now common to see short
*
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T Peter P. Weidenbruch Jr. Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University.
We would like to thank Professors James Cox, Quinn Curtis, Paul Davies, Fabrizio Ferri, Jill
Fisch, Jesse Fried, Martin Gelter, George Geis, Henry Hu, Michael Klausner, Colin Mayer, Brett
McDonnell, Frank Partnoy, Edward Rock, Harwell Wells and the participants of the Vanderbilt
Corporate Voting Workshop, for their helpful comments on this Article. We would also like to thank
Brendan Sullivan, Brittany Heyd, and Kyuwang Jeong from the Georgetown University Law Center
Class of 2012, 2013, and 2014 and Justin Gunter from the Vanderbilt Law School Class of 2013, for
their research. All remaining errors are our own.
1. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). Bayless Manning in a
classic article stated:
It is commonplace to observe that the modem shareholder ... does not think of himself or act
like an "owner." He hires his capital out to the [corporate] managers and they run it for him;
how they do it is their business, not his, and he always votes 'yes' on the proxy.
Bayless Manning, The Shareholder'sAppraisal Remedy: An Essayfor Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223,
261 (1962).
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slate proxy contests,2 board declassification proposals,' and "Say on Pay"
votes 4 occurring at public companies. The surge in the importance of
shareholder voting has caused increased conflict between shareholders and
directors, a tension well illustrated in recent voting battles. For example,
Carl Icahn's hedge fund opposed Michael Dell's 2013 bid to take Dell, Inc.
private, claiming that the price offered was too low.' After a prolonged
election battle, a change in the election rules, and a small increase in the
deal price, shareholders ultimately voted for the deal. In a similar vein, a
2012 Say on Pay vote by Citigroup shareholders against chief executive
officer Vikram Pandit's $15 million pay package led to his departure and
substantive changes to executive compensation, after which more than 90
percent of the firm's shareholders approved its proposed executive pay
scheme. 7 Yet, despite the obvious importance of shareholder voting, none
of the existing corporate law theories coherently justify it.'
2. Short slate contests arise when dissident shareholders, often hedge funds, seek to gain a
minority of seats on the board of directors. Steven M. Davidoff, Revisiting the Proxy Contest, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 2, 2009 9:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/02/revisiting-the-proxy-contest/.
Oftentimes companies will agree to such representation so long as key management directors get to
keep their seats. Joann S. Lublin & Drew FitzGerald, Activists Spur Horse Trading For Seats on
Corporate Boards, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2013, 8:00 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SBl0001424127887323423804579023262356923606.
3. The Shareholder Rights Project at Harvard Law School has been actively supporting
shareholders making these proposals. 98 Companies DeclassiiedDuring 2012-2014, SHAREHOLDER
RIGHTS PROJECT, http://srp.law.harvard.edu/declassifications.shtml (last updated June 30, 2014).
4. See generally Randall S. Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter & James F. Cotter, Dodd-Frank'sSay on
Pay: Will It Lead to a GreaterRole for Shareholders in CorporateGovernance? 97 CORNELL L. REV.
1213 (2012) (explaining the origins of shareholder advisory votes on corporate executive compensation
at public companies and analyzing its likely effects). See also infra text accompanying note 39.
5. Arik Hesseldahl, Ichan Makes Another Offerfor Dell as Shareholders Shrug, WALL ST. J.:
ALLTHINGsD, (July 1, 2013, 3:30 PM), http://allthingsd.com/20130701/icahn-makes-another-offer-fordell-as-shareholders-shrug/?KEYWORDS=Dell#. See also, Theo Francis, Dell's Buyout Fate Still
Hinges Mostly on Icahn, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2013, 3:41 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/07/22/dells-buyout-fate-still-hinges-mostly-on-icahn/ (discussing Carl Icahn's voting power in
opposing the proposed Dell buyout).
6. Ben Fox Rubin & David Benoit, Dell ShareholdersApprove Buyout, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12,
2013, 10:38 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/09/12/dell-shareholders-approve-buyout/. See
also Michael J. de la Merced, Dell Buyout Bid in Peril as Voting Rule Remains, N.Y. TIMES (July 31,
2013, 9:05 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/31/dell-offers-to-move-vote-on-takeover-butrefuses-to-bend-on-voting-rules/ (describing the Dell buyout and Dell's attempts to alter the voting
rules).
7. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Nelson D. Schwartz, Citigroup's Chief Rebuffed on Pay by
Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2012, 1:28 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/
citigroup-shareholders-reject-executive-pay-plan/; Tom Braithwaite, Dan McCrum & Kara Scannell,
Citigroup Sees Off Shareholder Revolt on Executive Pay, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2013, 5:29 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ef667544-acel-lle2-b27f-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2dOEJ6hvL.
8. For a critique of these theories, see infra PartI.
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Traditional theories about shareholder voting, rooted in concepts of
residual ownership and a principal-agent relationship, do not easily fit
within the longstanding legal structure of corporate law that generally
cabins the shareholder role in corporate governance. Nor do these theories
reflect recent fundamental changes as to who shareholders are and their
incentives to vote (or not to vote). Most shares today are owned by
intermediaries that usually hold other people's money within retirement
plans, and that follow business plans that give them little reason to vote
those shares or result in conflicts that may distort that vote. 9 Yet three key
developments have countered that reality and opened the way for
shareholder voting's new prominence. First, government regulations now
require many institutions to vote their stock in the best interests of their
beneficiaries. 10 Second, subsequent market innovations led to the birth of
proxy advisory firms, including Institutional Shareholder Services ("ISS"),
which help address the costs of voting and the collective action problems
inherent in coordinated institutional shareholder action." And third,
building on these developments, hedge funds have aggressively intervened
in corporate governance at firms seen as undervalued1 2 by making frequent
use of the ballot box to pressure targeted firms to create shareholder value,
thereby giving institutional shareholders a good reason to care about
voting.13
9. Institutions now own 70 percent or more of the shares in America's largest corporations, a
dramatic change from a generation ago. CONFERENCE BD., THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION 22 tbl. 10, 27 tbl.13 (2011).
10. See infra Part II.A.3.
11. ISS is the world's leading provider of proxy advisory services to institutional investors.
Governance Advisory Services, ISS, http://www.issgovernance.com/governance-solutions/governanceadvisory-services/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2014). For information regarding the development of proxy
advisory firms, see infra Part II.A.4.
Numerous studies have found that voting recommendations made by ISS carry great weight,
swinging 10-30 percent of the vote in many situations. See, e.g., Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri &
David Oesch, Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 951,
953 (2013) ("Negative ISS ... recommendations are associated with 24.7 [percent] ... more votes
against the compensation plan."). See also infra Part II.A.4 & Part III.B.3.b.
12. Alon Bray et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J.
FIN. 1729, 1730 (2008) ("Hedge fund activists tend to target companies that are typically 'value' firms,
with low market value relative to book value, although they are profitable with sound operating cash
flows and return on assets."). See also Michael J. de la Merced & Julie Creswell, With Huge War
Chests, Activist Investors Tackle Big Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2013, 9:01 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/with-huge-war-chests-activist-investors-tackle-big-cornpanies/
(discussing hedge fund activism in major corporations such as Microsoft and Procter & Gamble).
13. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs ofAgency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and The Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 897 (2013) ("Rather
[activist investors] are governance entrepreneurs, arbitraging governance rights that become more
valuable through their activity monitoring companies to identify strategic opportunities and then
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But there is more to the corporate franchise than hedge fund-inspired
voting. Say on Pay proposals, Rule 14a-8 corporate governance proposals,
and majority vote requirements for the election of directors are all
important, recurrent topics involving shareholder votes where the vote's
immediate impact on stock price may be positive1 4 but insufficient to lead
to hedge fund intervention, or which may affect only the long-term value of
the corporation.' 5
The newly invigorated shareholder voting is not without its critics
though. Corporate management has voiced fears about the increase in
shareholders' voting power,16 as well as about proxy advisory firms'
perceived conflicts of interest." The Securities and Exchange Commission
presenting them to institutional investors for their approval-through a proxy fight, should the portfolio
company resist the proposal. By giving the institutions this choice, the activists increase the value of
governance rights; the institutions' exercise of governance rights then becomes the mechanism for
creating value for beneficial owners."). See also infra Part III.A.
14. For evidence that some corporate votes have a positive impact on firm value, see J. Harold
Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy Contests and Corporate Change: Implicationsfor Shareholder
Wealth, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 279, 292-93 (1998) (finding that for proxy contests for elections of directors,
there is a statistically significant cumulative abnormal return of 8.04 percent twenty days before the
contest announcement until five days afterwards); Vincente Cufilat, Mireia Gin6 & Maria Guadalupe,
The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value, 67 J. FIN. 1943, 1954
(2012) [hereinafter Cufiat et al., The Vote is Cast] (finding that in close votes, the passage of
shareholder corporate governance proposals increases firm value); Vincente Cuilat, Mireia Gin6, &
Maria Guadalupe, Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance 4, 6, 9 (Eur. Corporate
Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 373/2013, 2013) [hereinafter Cuflat et al., Say Pays!],
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2240410 (proposing that the implementation of Say on Pay in
different countries around the world has increased firm value). See infra Part III.B.
15. See infra Part III. For purposes of this Article, we accept the claim that there can be
divergences between the value of a corporation's stock price and its "long-run" value. See Martin
Lipton, Deconstructing American Business II, BRIEFLY... PERSP. ON LEGIS., REG. & LITIG., Dec.

2006, at 1, 1 (claiming that "[p]ressure on boards from activist investors to manage for short-term share
price performance rather than long-term value creation" is a problem for American businesses in the
future). We note that there is an ongoing debate over whether there are differences between long-term
value and short-term value, and if so, the implications for corporate law. Compare Mark J. Roe,
CorporateShort-Termism-In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 Bus. LAW. 977, 977-78 (2013)
(finding minor support for the view that corporations' short-term perspectives influence corporate law),
and Lucian A. Bebehuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 1637, 1637 (2013) (arguing that board insulation from shareholder pressure creates long-term
costs), with Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better By OrdinaryInvestors: A PragmaticReaction to the
Dueling IdeologicalMythologists ofCorporateLaw 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 449 (2014) (specifically
rejecting Professor Bebchuk's argument), and Martin Lipton, The Bebchuk Syllogism, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/
AttorneyPubs/WLRK.22753.13.pdf 1, 2 (questioning Professor Bebchuk's methodology and conclusion
that short-term shareholder activism does not affect the long-term value of a corporation).
16. Lipton, Deconstructing American Business II, supra note 15, at 1-5 (discussing problems
stemming from the shift from "director-centric governance" to "shareholder centric governance").
17. ROBYN BEW & RICHARD FIELDS, TAPESTRY NETWORKS, INC., VOTING DECISIONS AT U.S.
MUTUAL FUNDS: How INVESTORS REALLY USE PROXY ADVISORS 6-7 (2012) ("ISS' practices such as
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("SEC") has asked for public comments on the possible undue influence of
proxy advisory firms on shareholder voting." Even institutional investors
have varying views on the topic. 19 Can we trust the vote to today's
intermediaries and those who advise them?
Our Article proceeds as follows. Part I develops our theory of
shareholder voting. We argue that shareholders (and only shareholders)
have been given the right to vote because they are the only corporate
stakeholders whose return on their investment is tied directly to the
company's stock price; if stock price is positively correlated with the
residual value of the firm, shareholders will want to maximize the firm's
residual value and vote accordingly. Thus, shareholder voting should lead
to value-maximizing decisions for the firm as a whole.
But that does not mean that shareholders should vote for everything.
Economic theory and accepted principles of corporate law tell us that
corporate officers exercise day-to-day managerial power at the public firm,
with boards of directors having broad monitoring authority over them. In
this framework, shareholder voting is explained by its comparative value as
a monitor. We would expect a shareholder vote to play a supplemental
monitoring role if the issue being decided affects the company's stock
price, or long-term value, and if the shareholder vote is likely to be
superior, or complementary, to monitoring by the board or the market. This
is particularly likely when officers or directors of the company suffer from
a conflict of interest, or may otherwise be seeking private benefits at the
expense of the firm. Thus shareholder voting can play a negative role as a
monitoring device by helping stop value-decreasing transactions.20
providing voting recommendations while also offering issuers services designed to suggest whether a
particular management proposal will meet with investors' approval have resulted in conflict-of-interest
charges.").
18. Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-62495, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240, 270, 274, 275 (July 14, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. Proxy System Concept Release], available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2010/34-62495.pdf The SEC held a Roundtable on December 23,
2013 regarding this topic. Proxy Advisory Services Roundtable, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxy-advisory-services.shtml (last visited Aug. 17, 2014).
19. Comment Letter from Council of Institutional Investors to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, on Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System in Release No. 34-62495, at 5-7
(Oct. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Comment Letter from Council of Institutional Investors], available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-80.pdf.
20. We note recent empirical evidence that shows mandatory shareholder voting on corporate
acquisitions increases firm value by stopping bad deals. Marco Becht, Andrea Polo & Stefano Rossi,
Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions? 31-32 (Eur. Corporate Govemance
Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 442/2014, 2014), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id-2443792.
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But monitoring is not the only theoretical justification for shareholder
voting. We posit two additional theories that provide positive reasons for
corporate voting because it enhances decisionmaking beyond monitoring.
Shareholder voting can provide: (1) a superior information aggregation
device for private information held by shareholders when there is
uncertainty about the correct decision, 2 1 and (2) an efficient mechanism for
aggregating heterogeneous preferences when the decision differentially
affects shareholders. 22
In Part II we explore whether contemporary shareholders have the
characteristics that permit them to play the roles our theory contemplates.
In particular, we examine the business plan that gives today's
intermediaries reasons not to vote or conflicts that can distort their vote.
Similar attention is given to the regulatory and market changes that have
grown up in response to this reality: government-required voting by
intermediaries; proxy advisory firms to let this voting occur more
efficiently; and hedge fund strategies to make voting pay, for themselves
and for other intermediaries such as mutual funds and pension funds.
In Part III, we use our theory to illuminate when shareholder voting is
justified. In Part III.A, we focus on the role of corporate voting where the
issue is a high-dollar, "big ticket" decision. We use hedge fund activism as
an example of this scenario and show how it fits with each of the prongs of
our voting theory. 23 Here we see voting performing the monitoring role
anticipated by our theory, but there is also an important role for aggregating
heterogeneous preferences among shareholders as institutional funds decide
whether to follow hedge fund initiatives. Part III.B makes the less obvious
case for shareholder voting where hedge funds drop out of the equationon decisions that have a smaller effect on stock prices or the company's
long-term value, such as Say on Pay, majority voting proposals, and board
21. Our information aggregation theory can be illustrated by a target company shareholder vote
on a merger offer where there is uncertainty about whether the price offered in the transaction is
sufficient. A shareholder vote on the merger is more likely to lead to the correct decision than solely a
vote of the board of directors, even if the board is not conflicted, because the increase in the number of
informed voters is more likely to lead to the correct decision. This result follows from the Condorcet
Jury Theorem. Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, CorporateVoting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 132
n.5, 149-50 (2009). See infra Part I.B.
22. An example where this theory comes into play arises when a board needs to choose between
issuing a dividend and using the same funds to make a strategic acquisition. Different shareholders may
have different preferences about these two outcomes because of their tax status, their degree of risk
aversion, or their time horizons. A shareholder vote will aggregate the shareholders' preferences to
decide the issue.
23. See Gilson & Gordon, supranote 13, at 897-99, for an analysis of hedge funds as leaders of
institutional investor activism.
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declassification proposals. It focuses on Say on Pay, finding that there is
substantial evidence that these votes increase firm value and, potentially,
long-term value.
In sum, this Article presents a positive theory of corporate voting as it
exists today. In doing so, it directly addresses the vast shifts in stock
ownership that have created intermediary capitalism and the important role
of government regulations and market participants in making corporate
voting effective. At the same time, it preserves for corporate management
the lion's share of corporate decisionmaking, subject to active shareholder
monitoring using corporate voting in conflict situations that affect stock

price.
We begin by providing a brief overview of the American corporate
governance system and how voting is presently employed in it.
I. DETERMINING THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. A PRIMER ON SHAREHOLDER VOTING

In the United States, most public corporations are effectively run by
corporate management. 24 This is a function of the economic reality that
large, diverse businesses need centralized management in order to facilitate
productive business activity. There are tremendous efficiencies created by
having a hierarchical decisionmaking structure that concentrates power in
the hands of professionally-trained, highly skilled personnel. 25 As a result,
our corporate governance system gives the chief executive officer ("CEO")
of the company the power to make most important corporate decisions in
order to operationalize these efficiencies.
However, the underlying legal structure of state corporate law filters
this economic reality. The common core of American corporation statutes
is a clear statement that all corporate power is placed in, or under the
authority of, the board of directors. 26 But the board is comprised of part24. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 13941(1976).
25. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Responses, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1746-51 (2006).
26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) ("The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors .... );
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §8.01(b) (2011) ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the
authority of the board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation
shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors .... .").
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time directors, many of whom have other full-time jobs, who can spend
little time worrying about the problems of the corporation. These directors
cannot effectively employ the control rights that the statutes provide them
and instead largely delegate to the corporation's officers the responsibility
to run the corporation. 27 Only in "crisis" situations will the board exercise
their ultimate power to approve, or override, corporate managers' key
decisions about the corporation's future.28
In this legal structure, shareholders play a crucial, but decidedly
subordinate, governance role. In contrast to the plenary role of the directors
and the managers, shareholders can do only a few things-voting, selling,
and suing-each in very limited doses. 29 These shareholder roles often
reflect a monitoring function. Managers of a corporation, as the holders of
day-to-day power over the sometimes vast aggregations of other people's
money, require some form of monitoring. Without any monitoring,
managers would be tempted to shirk their duties or divert assets to their
own private benefit. 30 Directors, of course, have the responsibility to
monitor corporate management, including the power to replace officers if
they find their performance lacking or detect managerial misconduct. But
directors are generally nominated to the board with management's consent
and may fear engaging in close monitoring of management.3 1 This creates
an important role for shareholders to play, for without shareholder
monitoring, the cost of capital would rise in order to mitigate investors'
concerns about misappropriation of corporate resources or a lack of effort
by the managers. 32
Among the three methods for shareholders to act as monitors, selling
and suing have significant limitations. Selling shares effectively disciplines
management only if the market for corporate control is robust. Defensive
tactics such as the poison pill effectively make selling dependent on a prior
successful voting campaign whenever the target board opposes the deal.33
27.

EISENBERG, supra note 24, at 140; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT

§§ 8.40-44.
28. One important example under Delaware law is when a corporation is being put up for sale.
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1985). A second
example occurs when the board determines that it needs to replace the CEO of the company because of
poor corporate performance.
29. Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting
ShareholderRights to Vote, Sell and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 216-18 (1999).
30. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 323-28 (1976).
31. EISENBERG, supranote 24, at 145-47.
32. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 30, at 312-13.
33. Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Selectica Resets the Trigger on the Poison Pill:
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Shareholder suits against the corporation also face significant barriers. 34
And even if successful, the remedy is often a payment out of the
corporation's coffers, which does little to deter future wrongdoing by
managers.
Can voting play a more effective role as a monitoring device?
Delaware Chancellor William Allen once described shareholder voting as
the ideological underpinning that "legitimates the exercise of power by
some (directors and officers) over vast aggregations of property that they
do not own."35 Abstractly speaking, we could put voting at the center of
corporate governance by starting from a philosophical foundation of
popular sovereignty parallel to what we see in our polity. 6 In this view,
shareholders are the ultimate repository of corporate authority, just as
citizens are the font of power in the republic. While recurring references to
shareholders as owners of the corporation reflect this view, the reality is
more complex because of the importance of centralized management in our
system.
Giving shareholder voting too broad a role imperils the efficiencies of
centralized management by replacing management decisionmaking with
shareholder decisionmaking.37 State corporate law reflects this by strictly
limiting the areas where shareholders are given a right to vote: they elect
directors; they approve certain fundamental changes such as a merger (but
only after directors have consented to the action); and they can sometimes
amend the corporation's bylaws. 38 Federal securities or tax law provides
additional opportunities for shareholder voting, although usually only of an
advisory nature. For example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank") mandates an advisory vote on
Where Should the Delaware Courts Go Next?, 87 IND. L.J. 1087, 1087-88, 1093-94 (2012). See also
Steven Davidoff Solomon, With Fewer Barbariansat the Gate, Companies Face a New Pressure,N.Y.
TIMES (July 30, 2013, 1:49 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/with-fewer-barbarians-at-thegate-companies-face-new-pressure/ (noting that "companies have fought over the last 30 years to kill
the hostile takeover" by adopting poison pills and lobbying state legislatures for anti-takeover statutes,
resulting in fewer hostile takeover attempts).
34. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation:
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 136 (2004) (highlighting additional
requirements for plaintiffs bringing representative shareholder suits).
35. Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
36. Lee Harris, The Politics of Shareholder Voting, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1761, 1782-85 (2011)
(comparing shareholder voting in corporate elections to citizen voting in political elections).
37. See David Yermack, Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance, 2 ANN. REV. FIN.
EcON. 103, 105-08 (2010) (summarizing papers on the design, administration, and impact on
corporations of shareholder voting).
38.

2 JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS

§ 13.1

(3d ed. 2010).
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executive compensation ("Say on Pay"),39 while Rule 14a-8 allows
shareholders to make precatory proposals on a broad range of governance
and social issues. 40 Shareholder approval is generally necessary for stock
option plans if the company is seeking to qualify the options for
preferential federal tax treatment. 4 1 Finally, shareholders can themselves
initiate action in a limited number of settings. Thus, in Delaware (and most
other states), shareholders, at least in the abstract, have the power to call a
special meeting, to use the written consent procedure, or to take any action
that shareholders are permitted to take at a regular annual shareholders
meeting.42
Corporate voting has been most important as a mechanism to bring
about a change of control of the board. While the overwhelming majority
of elections of directors involve only one slate of candidates, contested
elections of directors arise whenever a dissident group of shareholders
nominates an alternative slate of directors.43 Insurgents can seek to unseat
the entire board of directors ("proxy contests for corporate control") or they
can nominate a minority of directors in an effort to gain a voice on the
board ("short slate contests"). Proxy contests for corporate control are
frequently combined with hostile tender offers, where the potential buyer
seeks to gain control of the target firm's board of directors to remove the
target's poison pill, thereby permitting the target shareholders to sell their
shares without the bidder suffering massive dilution if it closes its offer."
A favorable shareholder vote is also needed to approve mergers or
certain other fundamental transactions, 45 when management seeks to
change the corporation's charter to implement a classified board of
39. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank"), Pub. L. No.
111-203, sec. 951, 124 Stat. 1375, 1899 (2010) (adding new section 14A to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934). See also Thomas, Palmiter & Cotter, supra note 4, at 1224-25 (explaining section 951 of
Dodd-Frank, which requires a shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation for the prior fiscal
year).
40. 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 38, § 13.32 (discussing shareholder use of Rule 14a-8, requiring
management to submit shareholder proposals for a shareholder vote).
41. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock
Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 31, 47-48 (2000).
42. RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL §§ 4.02(C)(3}-(4), 4.04(B) (3d ed. Supp. 2001) (discussing the requirements
under state law for stockholders to compel a special meeting and the requirements for stockholders to
use the written consent mechanism).
43. Id. §4.02(C)(1).
44. See Randall S. Thomas, JudicialReview of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests: When is
Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 VAND. L. REv. 503, 504-05, 510-12 (1993) (describing proxy contests
for corporate control and the use of "rights plans" (known as posion pills) as a defensive tactic).
45. 2 Cox & HAZEN, supranote 38, § 13.1.
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directors, 46 or to effect a dual class recapitalization. 47 In these settings, the
vote permits shareholders to monitor director decisions that may be
distorted by management self-interest.
Advisory shareholder votes can lead to important governance
changes. 48 The Shareholder Rights Project, for example, has consistently
garnered over 80 percent shareholder support for Rule 14a-8 board
declassification proposals at Fortune 500 companies. 49 Many of the boards
of companies receiving these proposals subsequently asked their
shareholders to vote on proposed charter amendments to remove their
classified boards, which the shareholders then overwhelmingly approved.so
While providing for shareholder voting in the areas just outlined,
corporate statutes have a distinctly contractarian flavor as to who exercises
that vote. The firm's incorporation documents can limit or deny the vote to
most shareholders so long as there is at least one share with full voting
power,5 1 and prominent companies, such as Google, have made use of that
private ordering possibility.52
46. See Sanjai Bhagat & James A. Brickley, Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority
Shareholder Voting Rights, 27 J.L. & ECON. 339, 353-62 (1984) (finding negative abnormal stock
returns when firms classify boards of directors or eliminate cumulative voting).
47. Stock exchange rules will limit this type of recapitalization for existing listed public
companies. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 313.00-40 (2014),
available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?searched-l&selectednode=
chp_1_4_13 l&CiRestriction-dual&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Fcm-sections%2F. Dual class
recapitalizations may have other adverse consequences for shareholders besides the loss of voting
control. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Thorny Side Effects in Silicon Valley Tactic to Keep Control,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2013, 5:16 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/thomy-side-effects-insilicon-valley-tactic-to-keep-controll (pointing out that technology companies with dual class structures
may have trouble sustaining themselves once founders leave and control remains in management's
hands).
48. See, e.g., Thomas, Palmiter & Cotter, supra note 4, at 1213 (analyzing Say on Pay advisory
voting and its impact on executive compensation).
49. Lucian Bebchuk, Scott Hirst & June Rhee, Toward Board Declassificationin 100 S&P 500
and Fortune 500 Companies: The SRP's Reportfor the 2012 and 2013 Proxy Seasons, HARV. L. SCH.
FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Feb. 25,
2014, 9:12 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/02/25/toward-board-declassification-in-100-sp-500-andfortune-500-companies-the-srps-report-for-the-2012-and-2013-proxy-seasons/
(announcing that the
Project had submitted fifty-eight successful precatory proposals seeking the removal of classified
boards, with average support of 81 percent).
50. Id.
51. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(b) (2011) ("Any stock of any class or series may be made
subject to redemption by the corporation at its option or at the option of the holders of such stock or
upon the happening of a specified event; provided however, that immediately following any such
redemption the corporation shall have outstanding 1 or more shares of I or more classes or series of
stock, which share, or shares together, shall have full voting powers.").
52. Davidoff Solomon, supra note 47.

1370

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87: 1359

B. WHY SHAREHOLDERS HAVE VOTING RIGHTS
Next we present a positive theory of shareholder voting. A few
caveats before we begin. First, we are not making normative claims about
the merits of shareholder voting. We are agnostic on the question of
whether shareholder voting leads either to social or corporate efficiency.
We offer a positive theory that explains what we observe in the world about
the role of the shareholder franchise.
Second, we restrict our analysis to publicly traded corporations with
dispersed ownership. There is little doubt that shareholder voting in other
contexts, for example, close corporations or firms with a single majority
owner, has different characteristics. In those contexts, we would anticipate
additional or different roles for voting. We focus on publicly traded
corporations because they are the most significant ones economically and
are the most affected by intermediary capitalism.
Third, we focus on mandatory voting rights, that is, situations in
which shareholders are obligated to vote on certain issues. Institutional
investors, who hold the vast majority of large public companies' stock, are
obligated to vote their shares by government regulation, as we discuss in
Part II. They are faced with a large number of mandatory votes each year
because they hold diversified portfolios of stock, often including several
thousand portfolio companies. Mandatory voting rules are also particularly
important at public companies where significant collective action problems
make it difficult for shareholders to negotiate value-maximizing contractual
voting rights. By enforcing a mandatory vote, the government solves the
collective action problem that might otherwise result in too little voting.
However, our theory provides an important baseline justification for
corporate voting in general and could potentially be extended to the
analysis of purely contractual voting. 53
Traditional theory has justified the shareholder franchise based on a
shareholder's status as either an owner of the residual interest in the firm or
as a principal in a principal-agent relationship with directors and
management. This theory has proven inadequate to capture the role
shareholders actually have under corporate law or the changed nature of
shareholders in today's world of intermediary capitalism.
53. For example, we leave for another day questions that arise about the appropriate form of
venture capitalists' contractual voting rights in start-up firms. See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried and Mira Ganor,
Agency Costs of Venture CapitalistControl in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 967, 967 (2006) (discussing
how the governance structure of venture capitalist-backed startups can lead to high agency costs due to
preferred shareholder control of the board and thus the firm).
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For example, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have argued that
shareholders' residual interest in the corporation gives them "the
appropriate

incentives . . . to

make

discretionary

decisions.... The

shareholders receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of the
marginal costs. They therefore have the right -incentives to exercise
discretion."54 The corporation is an incomplete contract and the discretion
to fill any gaps in that contract is exercised via the vote. So the right to vote
follows from the shareholder's claim on the residual value of the firm, and
this right extends to any issue that has not been explicitly contracted for
within the corporation.
Yet shareholders, as finance theory has taught us, are not the only
stakeholders with a claim to residual value. Options theory suggests that
debt holders also have a claim on the residual value,"s but we rarely see
debt holders having a vote unless the corporation is in financial distress.
Along similar lines, many other stakeholders have claims on the residual
value of the firm without receiving voting rights. 6 Even the assertion that
shareholders have a claim on the residual value is contingent. They cannot,
as a rule, force the board to issue dividends to capture that value." They
can only tap into the residual value of the firm if they can sell their shares
and the stock market reflects the improvements in the firm in its stock
price.
Similarly, Easterbrook and Fischel's theory is too broad in claiming
that shareholders have the right to make all "gap-filling" decisions for the
firm.5 s States' corporation codes give the plenary governance role to the
directors, not the shareholders. 59 In other words, the board fills the gaps,
and it is exactly this centralized control that some claim is the primary
54. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 68 (1991).
55. Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1189, 1192 (2002).
56. MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 231-32 (1995); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH:
How PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS AND THE PUBLIC 41 (2012).
57. Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), af'd, 387
N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (applying business judgment rule and dismissing shareholder suit
seeking to force the board to pay a dividend).
58. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supranote 54, at 66.
59. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) ("The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .");
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2011) ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the
authority of the board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation
shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors .... ).
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benefit of the corporate form. 60
Moreover, Easterbrook and Fischel's theory could justify shareholders
voting on almost any set of issues. According to them, shareholders are
allowed to delegate much of their power to the board, but they offer no
description of when they would be likely to do so, so that their theory is
consistent with strong, weak, or virtually no, shareholder voting. We prefer
a model which gives a better descriptive account of voting as it exists
today.
A second theory of shareholder voting rights is based on Michael
Jensen and William Meckling's claim that the exchange of equity for
capital establishes a principal-agent relationship between the shareholders
and the board of directors.6 1 An agent, the board, will be tempted to extract
private benefits using its control of the firm's assets, and so the principals,
the shareholders, must monitor the agent to protect their interests. There
will be a trade-off between the price of equity and the amount of
monitoring imposed-the less monitoring imposed, the higher the risk to
the shareholder and hence the cost of equity to the firm should increase.
Under this view, shareholder voting is one monitoring mechanism.
Jensen and Meckling are describing a principal-agent model based on
elements of economics and theories of the firm that only incompletely
translate to law. The common law, and particularly the law of agency, have
a more robust view of agency that imposes fiduciary duties on agents
"when one person (a 'principal') manifests assent to another person (an
'agent') that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the
principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so
to act." 62 But the law is clear that the shareholder-director relationship does
not come within this legal concept. Directors have the autonomous power
to make virtually all business decisions under all the states' corporate
statutes, which is difficult to reconcile with them being under the
shareholders' "control." Moreover, the law does not generally require the
board to act on behalf of the shareholders. Indeed, the Restatement (Third)
of Agency states explicitly: "Although a corporation's shareholders elect its
60. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Casefor Limited ShareholderVoting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV.
601, 619-28 (2006) (arguing that the system of the separation of ownership and control of a corporation
has benefited investors and society).
61. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 30, at 312-13. This is a theoretical refinement of Adolf A.
Berle, Jr. and Gardner C. Means's observation of the separation of ownership and control in the modem
corporation. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDNER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIvATE

PROPERTY 119-20 (1933).
62.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY

§ 1.01

(2006).
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directors and may have the right to remove directors once elected, the
directors are neither the shareholders' nor the corporation's agents as
defined in this section, given the treatment of directors within
contemporary corporation law in the United States."63
For theoretical purposes, this deficiency need not be fatal. In fact,
Jensen and Meckling describe an agency relationship more loosely "as a
contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves
delegating some decisionmaking authority to the agent."6 Is there an
agency relationship between shareholders and the board in this more
informal sense? Superficially we might think so, but it depends on the
characterization of the transaction between the shareholders and the
corporation. If the corporation has issued debt, then we might equivalently
view the shareholders as having purchased a call option from the debt
holders. From this perspective there is no principal-agent relationship
between shareholders and the board, but instead one between debt holders
and the board. Indeed as one explores alternative interpretations of the
financial relationships among stakeholders in the corporation through the
lens of options theory, it becomes clear that there is arbitrariness to
assigning control and duties among the participants. 65
But even if we credit this principal-agent relationship, it still may not
justify shareholder voting. While voting may act as a monitoring device to
lower capital costs, so could other forms of monitoring such as the market
for corporate control or shareholder litigation. Alternatively, shareholders
could choose to trade voting rights for a higher return on their stock. In the
language of Oliver Williamson's transaction cost model of the
corporation, 66 granting the vote to the shareholder permits the corporation
to lower its cost of capital by providing assurances to the shareholders that
their asset-specific investments will not be misappropriated. But why
should this trade-off always result in a vote for shareholders and a lower
price of capital instead of no shareholder vote and a higher stock price?
In fact, sometimes corporations opt for the latter arrangement. In the
initial public offering of Google's dual classes of shares, the public market
63. Id. § 1.01 cmt. f(2) at 29.
64. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 30, at 308.
65. Frank Partnoy, Adding Derivatives to the CorporateLaw Mix, 34 GA. L. REV. 599, 608-12
(2000).
66. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 135, 136 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
t
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in its reduced-voting shares was quite robust.17 Why would shareholders
agree to take equity positions in a company with no real voice and no
assurance of return? Evidently they thought they would see an adequate
future return without being able to control the company's directors. Google
executives, by paying their employees in stock (and stock options) have
effectively bonded themselves 68 to an alternative monitor, their own
employees. So perhaps the shareholders of Google felt assured that their
interests would be adequately represented to the board through this
alternative mechanism.
Under this contractarian approach to the corporation, shareholders
have the right to vote because they contracted for it. If they choose to invest
in companies without voting rights and alternative monitoring mechanisms,
then either the equity holders got a great price, or they believe the board
will perform its duties, or some combination of the two. But we cannot
know which, and certainly the granting of a vote is not a requirement for
the "right" contract.
Is there a better theoretical foundation for giving shareholders the
vote? There is one way in which shareholders are unique in their
relationship to the corporation-they are the sole stakeholders whose return
on investment is tied closely to the stock price of the corporation. The only
way shareholders can be sure of getting a return on their investment is to
sell the stock at market price and realize a capital gain (or loss). They
cannot be assured of a dividend distribution or any other payment from the
corporation, because only the directors can make those decisions. All other
stakeholders-employees, debt holders, suppliers-largely know what their
returns will be, subject to assorted risks associated with any contractual
relationship. 69
67. Steve Gelsi, Google Closes Above $100 a Share, MARKETWATCH: WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19,
2004, 6:50 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/google-shares-rise-18-on-first-day-close-above100/print?guid=892B3D22-BO24-4119-A5EB-A56E2DD46100 ("The Google IPO consists of Class A
shares, which have one-tenth of the voting power of the company's 237.6 million Class B shares, which
are held by insiders."). See also Dan Gallagher, By Some Measures, Google Shares Are Much Cheaper
at Its 9-Year IPO Anniversary, MARKETWATCH: WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2013, 12:30 PM),
http://blogs.marketwatch.com/thetell/2013/08/19/by-some-measures-google-shares-are-much-cheaperat-its-9-year-ipo-anniversary/ (showing the market strength of Google shares with limited voting power
since their initial public offering in 2004); Davidoff Solomon, supra note 47 (discussing Google's
efforts in 2013 to offer shares with no voting rights).
68. Jensen & Meckling, supranote 30, at 323-26.
69. The recent trend to tie "pay for performance" by including stock in the compensation
packages for management somewhat complicates this analysis. There is much debate as to the effect of
this type of package. For the purposes of this Article, however, we will lump management holding
shares with the other stockholders. But, as described above, if equity constitutes a substantial portion of
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We will assume that the share price is positively correlated with the
residual value of the firm. 70 We will also assume that stock markets are
given sufficient information about publicly traded firms so that the residual
value is generally accurately reflected in the share price.7 Consequently,
shareholders are the only corporate stakeholders whose return is dependent
on both the residual value of the firm and the provision of accurate
information to the stock market. So it is in the interest of the shareholders
that the firm's residual value be maximized and that this value be
accurately reflected in the market. There is almost no way for the
shareholders to contractually obligate corporate directors to do this. It is for
this reason that shareholders may require some voice in the firm.
The fact that shareholders are motivated by the residual value of the
firm and dependent on efficient capital markets has ancillary social
benefits. While the residual value of the corporation may not be the only
measure of board success, it certainly is an important one. 72 So, to the
extent that shareholders insist on having a vote as a part of the negotiation
for an equity stake, we might well expect that their influence will, on
average, be positive for the well-being of the corporation.
As discussed earlier, shareholders typically have three different ways
to voice their concerns to the corporation: sue, sell, or vote.7 3 Why are the
first two options insufficient? Suing generally has very large transaction
costs: legal fees are high, acquiring information (for example, discovery) is
costly, and the judicial system moves slowly. Moreover, courts may not be
competent to make decisions about corporate policy.7 4 Even so, lawsuits
compensation across the institution, then it may act as a bonding method by the board and thus serve as
an alternative monitoring mechanism.
70. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supranote 54, at 18-20.
71. See STEPHEN A. ROSS, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & JEFFREY F. JAFFE, CORPORATE
FINANCE 459 (9th ed. 2010) (discussing efficient capital markets and how "market efficiency implies
that stock prices reflect all available information").
72. Lynn Stout justifies shareholder voting in a similar way. While she advances a teamproduction theory of the corporation, she acknowledges the criticism that such a theory has the potential
to give too much leeway to the decisions of management-leaving them able to justify any decision,
even ones that result in self-interested behavior-because there are few objective indicia for their
performance. Thus, as a second-best solution, she proposes that using stock price as a general proxy for
the performance of the board, and thus using the shareholders as monitors, might cabin board behavior
to achieve superior firm performance. She views this as a purely empirical question-does monitoring
by shareholders through the vote achieve better results than letting the board act without such
monitoring? See Stout, supranote 55, at 1199-1201.
73. Thompson, supranote 29, at 216-18.
74. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 266 (Del. 2000) (refusing to second guess board's
decision to award compensation package to departing executive). One main reason for the business
judgment rule is that boards are much better situated than courts to make business decisions. 2 Cox &
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coupled with securities regulations can help ensure that stock markets
receive accurate information about a corporation. But the barriers to
successful lawsuits are getting higher as corporations seek to adopt bylaw
provisions requiring shareholders to arbitrate, rather than litigate, disputes
with the corporation.7 ' And even when shareholders retain the right to go to
court, choice of venue provisions can make suits more difficult. 76
What about the option to sell? Unhappy shareholders can convey their
frustration with the board by selling their shares. Of course, a selling
shareholder is forced to lock in a lower valuation than she thinks she
deserves, thereby losing investment returns. For that reason, making selling
the only monitoring mechanism is not an attractive option.
Selling might be an effective monitoring tool in two situations. First, a
robust market for corporate control would cause competition for shares that
would push the market valuation of the company closer to its actual
residual value. 77 This would allow shareholders to get a fair valuation for
their shares because underperforming companies would get taken over at a
bargain price,78 vitiating the need for other forms of monitoring. Today,
however, numerous defensive tactics, such as poison pills and classified
boards, can be deployed to prevent a corporate takeover, leaving this
market quite weak.
A second way that selling shares can be an effective monitoring
device stems from stock-based compensation for managers. If other
shareholders sell their shares, this will put downward pressure on the stock
price, lowering the value of managers' shares. This may lead managers to
pay more attention to the shareholders' concerns. While plausible, this
scenario requires that management compensation be closely tied to the
share price and that managers' stockholdings be a substantial percentage of
their wealth. Yet, if this is the case, concentrated selling may give
HAZEN, supra note 38, § 10:2 (describing the business judgment rule). See also Kamin v. Am. Express
Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), affd, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)
(on file with authors) (applying the business judgment rule and refusing to second guess a board's
decision to refrain from paying out a shareholder dividend).
75. E.g., Second Amended Class Action and Derivative Complaint at 51-52, Cent. Laborers'
Pension Fund v. Portnoy, No. 24-C-13-1966 (Bait. Cir. Ct. May 31, 2013) (arguing that an arbitration
provision added as a bylaw should be considered invalid because shareholders never voted on the
bylaw).
76. E.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(holding that unilaterally adopted bylaws requiring Delaware as the forum for litigation were facially
valid under Delaware law).
77. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110,
112-14 (1965). There are significant transactions costs inherent in takeover bids, though.
78. Id.
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shareholders too much sway over the performance of management.
We conclude that voting, when applicable, is the most desirable form
of monitoring. Moreover, voting provides additional positive benefits to the
corporation. In some circumstances, it allows shareholders to aggregate
private information and thus acts to correct board errors. 79 In other settings,
it can act to aggregate the heterogeneous preferences of the shareholders. 80
Both of these functions will be discussed further in the next section.
We close this section with two important notes. First, we are not
claiming that shareholder voting must be universal. Shareholders may
choose to give up the vote in favor of a better price for equity, higher
expected returns, or relying on incentives in place given the market or
corporate governance provisions and other disciplining mechanisms.
However, as an empirical matter, for public corporations in the United
States, the opportunity for shareholders to make such trade-offs and invest
in dual class shares are infrequent because stock exchange rules prohibit
new midstream dual class recapitalizations. 8 ' This means that dual class
shares are largely sold only in a small set of initial public offerings.
Second, we are not arguing that the board is required to maximize the
stock price. With the exception of Revlon settings, 82 there is no legal
requirement that they do so. Even though voting gives shareholders a voice
in some decisions, the board is not required generally to heed that voice.
Shareholders are only one of the stakeholders that influence the board,
except in those rare settings where they must approve board action or
initiate it on their own. Giving shareholders a vote is far different from
giving them control.
C. WHEN SHOULD SHAREHOLDERS VOTE?

If shareholder voting is desirable, then when should shareholders
vote-on every business decision, or just those mandated by corporate
statutes? 83 In this section, we offer three theories about what shareholders
79. See infra Part I.C.2.a.
80. See infra Part I.C.2.b.
81. For an insightful analysis of the shareholder voting issues surrounding midstream dual class
recapitalizations, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem
ofShareholderChoice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 3 (1988).
82. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d. 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(holding that a board has a duty to shareholders to maximize shareholder return in a sale of control).
83. Stephen M. Bainbridge argues that voting's transaction costs are so high, and its benefits so
diffuse, that shareholders should not vote at all. Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 622-24. We agree that
efficiency constraints are important, and we consider them in this part, but they implicate whether
shareholders will participate in the voting process rather than the theoretical role shareholders should

1378

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87: 1359

should vote on. The first is based on the importance of shareholder
monitoring. Corporate officers have great power, and boards of directors,
while possessing seemingly endless legal authority over officers, have a
limited ability to practically monitor how managers use their power. A
shareholder vote can play a monitoring role if the issue being decided
affects the company's stock price, or long-term value, and if the
shareholder vote is likely to be superior, or complementary, to that of the
board of directors as a monitoring mechanism. This is particularly likely to
be the case in situations where the officers or directors of the company
suffer from a conflict of interest or may otherwise be seeking private
benefits at the expense of the firm. Voting plays a negative role by stopping
value-decreasing transactions.
Our remaining two theories provide positive reasons for corporate
voting by enhancing the board's decisionmaking beyond merely
monitoring it. We claim that corporate voting provides: (1) a superior
information aggregation device for private information held by
shareholders when there is uncertainty about the correct decision; and
(2) an efficient mechanism for aggregating heterogeneous preferences
when the decision differentially affects shareholders.
1. Shareholder Monitoring Theory: What Shareholders Should Vote On
Shareholder voting is an important monitoring mechanism in many
situations. 84 As developed in Part I.A, our rationale for shareholders
monitoring through voting-they are the unique stakeholders whose
assured return is contingent on the stock price-limits the appropriate
range of issues for shareholder voting. Looking at the spectrum of all
instances where shareholders currently vote, we see at one end voting to
approve a merger or the sale of all, or substantially all, the assets of the
corporation. This type of vote falls squarely into those questions
appropriate for shareholder monitoring because these sales implicate the
stock price and deserve shareholder scrutiny. In a management buyout
transaction, for example, the board frequently is conflicted, or at least
captured, and may be helping management to reap gains at the expense of
the firm, especially if the proposed merger was a defensive one, designed
to thwart potential hostile acquirers. In this case, a shareholder vote
approving the merger plays an important monitoring function that
play.
84. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for IncreasingShareholderPower, 118 HARV. L.
REv. 833, 865-70 (2005) (discussing the benefits of allowing shareholders to have increased voting
powers).
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backstops the board's decision and is not overly costly. At the other end of
the spectrum, we put precatory votes on social policy issues with little
likelihood of affecting share price. Shareholders have no special interest in
such votes and little incentive to monitor them." Shareholders who object
have an easy and inexpensive remedy-sell their stock.
The costs of voting are an important consideration. 86 There is a serious
collective action problem in shareholder voting: the benefits of a successful
vote accrue to all shareholders but the costs of voting (for example,
information acquisition, preparation and distribution of materials,
mustering support) are borne by each voter separately so that shareholders
may have inadequate incentives to vote. But there are ways to overcome
this problem in corporate voting. For example, mutual funds are required
by legal rules to cast informed votes.87 Other shareholders, such as hedge
funds, can accumulate voting shares to increase their returns from voting,
making it efficient for them to vote on an informed basis. Since institutions
are often required to vote, or find it economically desirable to vote, the
market has responded to their need for information through the
development of proxy advisory firms, such as ISS, that efficiently gather
this information. Moreover, shareholders' costs have also been dropping
due to the acceptance of e-proxy as a means of disseminating
information.88
We are describing necessary conditions for the benefits of shareholder
voting, not sufficient ones. In particular, there are situations in which the
board may be conflicted in a way that affects share price but where
shareholders can free ride on the monitoring by other constituencies. For
example, it would be reasonable for shareholders to rely on the debt
markets to monitor assumptions of a large amount of debt. Such monitoring
is free to the shareholders and so they avoid any of the costs of voting.
To summarize, our shareholder monitoring justification for corporate
85. Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium:
Shareholder Support, Board Response, and Market Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FiN. 368, 370 (2007)
("Academic research has generally concluded that corporate governance proposals raise important
substantive issues, while social responsibility proposals are frequently viewed as frivolous.").
86. The importance of considering the costs of shareholder voting is made forcefully in
Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 622-24.
87. See infra Part II.A.3.
88. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Shareholder Power: Forget
Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L. REV. 475, 487-89 (2008) (noting that the
SEC e-proxy rules, adopted in 2008, could reduce costs for shareholders, since the e-proxy system
"ultimately may reduce the cost of engaging in proxy contests, thereby increasing the effectiveness and
efficiency of proxy contests as a source of discipline in the corporate governance process.").
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voting can be stated as follows. A shareholder vote may be justified if:
(1) the issue affects stock value immediately or in the long term;89
(2) management is either conflicted or the board is likely to be captured;
and (3) the systemic benefits that will be realized from monitoring by the
shareholders exceed the costs of monitoring. To this point, we have
assumed that the role of the shareholder vote is to monitor the behavior of a
potentially conflicted, or captured, board that shareholders think will not be
adequately disciplined by other monitors. Implicit in that analysis is that
there is a correct answer as to what maximizes share price, but the
shareholders cannot rely on the board to reach that conclusion because of
its private incentives. Monitoring thus plays a negative role in stopping
board misconduct or mistakes.
2. Alternative Justifications for Shareholder Voting
In addition to our shareholder monitoring theory, there are two other
important justifications for a shareholder vote enhancing the
decisionmaking of the board beyond merely monitoring it. First, when
there is uncertainty about what is the correct decision, a shareholder vote
can aggregate private information available to shareholders. Second, when
there is no objectively correct decision to be made, but rather the decision
will affect different shareholders in different ways, a shareholder vote will
effectively aggregate the heterogeneous preferences of the shareholders.
a. Private Information Aggregation
Suppose that an action will have an uncertain effect on the share price
and that each voter is more likely than not to be correct about what that
effect will be. Two of us have argued that voting is an excellent way to
aggregate private information in an uncertain world. 90 Then a decision by a
majority vote will have a very high probability of being correct, and the
larger the electorate, the more likely the majority vote will be correct. For
example, in an arm's length merger, if there is some uncertainty about
whether the merger price is fair, then a shareholder vote is more likely to
get the correct answer than a mere vote of the board, even if the board is
not conflicted, because of the increase in the overall number of informed
89. We include situations where managers' actions affect the "long-term value" (as opposed to
the immediate stock price) of the company, although we recognize that there is ongoing debate on
whether it is possible to enhance long-term value in a way that is not reflected in the actual stock price.
See supra note 15. However, as we hear corporate boards routinely making the claim that long-term
value is different from stock price value, we think that their actions should be monitored by the
shareholders when they claim that such a divergence exists from stock prices.
90. Thompson & Edelman, supra note 21, at 149.
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voters:91 In this way, a shareholder vote can act as an error-correction
device for the board decision.
The efficacy of a shareholder vote under this theory is based on a
couple of assumptions. First, the vote must be on a question to which there
is an objectively correct answer. Questions closely related to the stock
price, such as the approval of a merger, should fall into this category. A
second key assumption is that the voters, on average, are more likely than
not to be correct if making this decision. 92 This assumption is plausible for
decisions that implicate the stock price, because shareholders, and
especially institutional shareholders, have the incentive to gather the
necessary information.9 3 Thus, for some corporate decisions, a shareholder
vote can aggregate the private information held by the shareholders and
lead to a better decision than one made solely by the board. 94 In this way, a
shareholder vote may actually improve the board's decisionmaking.
b. Heterogeneous Preference Aggregation
The second situation in which a vote by shareholders may aid the
board in its decisionmaking arises when the issue differentially affects
shareholders and the board wants, or needs, to know the overall preference
of the shareholders. For example, Biglari Holdings ("Biglari"), a hedge
fund with a 20 percent stake in Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.
("Cracker Barrel"), proposed a shareholder vote on a resolution that the
corporation should take on significant debt in order to make a twenty-dollar
per share dividend. 95 It is possible that the dividend proposal was a valuereducing strategy, although Biglari surely did not think so. But more likely,
91.
This follows from the Condorcet Jury Theorem. For the technical details see Thompson &
Edelman, supra note 21, at 132 n.5, 132-33, and see generally Paul H. Edelman, On Legal
Interpretationsof the CondorcetJury Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 327 (2002) (offering three models
of the Condorcet Jury Theorem based on the way users incorporate randomness into the theorem).
92. For a technical specification of this condition, see Bernard Grofman, Guillermo Owen &
Scott L. Feld, Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth, 15 THEORY & DECISION 261 (1983).
93. They may also contract out the information gathering aspect of their process to proxy
advisory firms. See infra Part II.A.4 for further discussion.
94. For a longer disquisition on this conclusion, see generally Thompson & Edelman, supra note
21 (setting forth this new error correction theory of shareholder voting based on information theory).
95. For a detailed look at the interactions between Biglari and Cracker Barrel see CrackerBarrel
Old Country Stores, Inc. and Biglari Holdings Inc.: Chronology of Events Surrounding Proxy Contest
for BoardRepresentation, UNSOLICITED VIEWS (Morrison & Foerster), June 2014 [hereinafter Cracker
Barrel and Biglari Proxy Contest Chronology], available at http://media.mofo.com/files/
Uploads/Images/UV-Cracker-Barrell-Biglari-Holdings.pdf.
Biglari also ran a short slate contest to try to secure two seats on the board. Id; Kevin Roose, Taking a
Page From Buffett for His Own Path, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2012, 8:18 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/taking-a-page-from-buffett-for-his-own-path/.
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there was just disagreement among the shareholders as to whether they
preferred to recognize an immediate short-term return or wait for a longterm one. One reasonable way to aggregate the preferences is to have a
shareholder vote on the proposal, as was done in this case at the company's
initiative after Biglari pushed for it (and in which the proposal was
defeated).96
Different shareholders may well have different preferences about
these two outcomes. Those desirous of quick returns may opt for the
dividend; those with longer time horizons may prefer the company's
existing business plan. The tax status of the shareholder will likely affect
his or her preference amongst these choices. Also, shareholders who are
risk averse might prefer the cash now rather than the expected gains in the
future. Under these circumstances, voting aggregates the preferences of the
shareholders on this topic. The fact that Biglari's proposal was defeated
indicates that those shareholders with long-term interests outvoted those
with short-term ones.
While some have argued that shareholders are in fact a homogeneous
group and use that fact to justify limiting the vote to shareholders,"? the
inherent heterogeneity of shareholders plays a key role in this Article. The
rise of intermediary capitalism means that institutions-mutual funds,
pension funds, hedge funds, and the like-are the key voting shareholders
today. These institutions each face unique incentives, different from each
other and certainly different from individual shareholders. Thus, in the
contemporary world, the ability to aggregate preferences through a vote is
critically important.
3. Conclusion
What we have proposed here is a positive theory of shareholder
voting. Since shareholders are unique among corporate constituencies in
their sensitivity to the share price, we expect that they could potentially
seek to have a vote over issues that are likely to affect share price. But not
all such issues are likely to be voted on because there are more efficient
alternative monitors (like boards of directors) in many situations and
cheaper methods of monitoring-shareholder voting on lots of issues
would be costly. Thus, we would expect that only a subset of issues is
actually worth the cost of active monitoring by shareholder voting. In most
96. We could envision more exotic methods than per share voting to aggregate preferences-for
example, auctions-but such investigations go beyond the scope of this Article.
97. Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 620-21.
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circumstances, the board is likely to be the superior decisionmaker unless it
is conflicted, or self-interested, in which case shareholders are likely to be
better.
Our theory also advances two non-monitoring benefits that can be
achieved by voting-aggregation of private information and aggregation of
preferences. In these cases we need not have concern about conflict of the
board because the shareholder vote has benefits even if the board is not
conflicted.
II. INCENTIVES TO VOTE (OR NOT VOTE) AND RESPONSES TO
THOSE INCENTIVES
Having developed a theory of shareholder voting that justifies giving
the franchise to shareholders, and delineated the types of subjects for which
a shareholder vote is beneficial for the corporation, we next address
shareholders' incentives to vote. Just because shareholders should vote on a
particular issue does not guarantee that they will. Voting is costly. There
are information costs, organization costs, communication costs, and more.
And whatever benefits are realized will be distributed among all of the
shareholders. Collective action and free-rider problems are inherent to the
process. So how do we provide incentives to shareholders to exercise the
functions that we have outlined?
Two behavioral patterns are the focus of our concern. Nonvoting,
always a worry with individual mom-and-pop shareholders, remains as
large a challenge for institutional investors who have become the dominant
players in the shareholder world over the last four decades. Second, even if
these intermediaries overcome the disincentives to vote, conflicts of
interest may lead them to vote in ways that do not maximize firm value.
For shareholder voting to play its proper role, there must be adequate
responses to both these problems.
Framing both questions is the vast growth of institutional investors:
rising from less than 5 percent of equities in 1950, they hold 70 percent or
more among our publicly held corporations today. 98 These intermediaries
largely reflect the particular structure of American retirement planning over
the last forty years. Institutions are intermediaries, investing money for
others. There are agency benefits arising from possible specialization and
economies of scale that come from hiring agents. But we must balance
these benefits against the costs of monitoring the agents and the losses
98.

CONFERENCE BD., supra note 9, at 22 tbl.10, 27 tbl.13.
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arising from disloyalty or slacking. 99 To evaluate the usefulness of
shareholder voting, we must assess the alignment of the intermediaries'
interests with those of their beneficiaries across the different categories of
institutional investors.
The first section of Part II focuses on why shareholders do not vote.
We then examine (1) the government's response to this inertia by
mandating that fiduciaries' vote and (2) a key market response to this
regulatory mandate, the growth of new market actors-proxy advisory
firms-that provide information and services in meeting this obligation.
The last section evaluates the conflicts that each of the institutions has and
how public policy should address them.
A. WHY DON'T SHAREHOLDERS VOTE?

Individual shareholders routinely ignore requests to cast their proxy
ballots in corporate elections, just as fewer than 60 percent of the registered
voters participate in political elections. 00 There are various reasons why
people do not vote; in fact, in the political context, it has proven nearly
impossible to give a rational actor explanation for why anyone votes at
all.' 0 ' The basic problem is that the likelihood that one vote will alter the
election is miniscule, while the tangible benefit of the outcome of an
election is modest for any given individual, so if the act of voting entails
any cost at all, it will be inefficient to cast a ballot. Moreover, there is a
classic collective action problem that has to be overcome-the benefits
secured by a vote are available to everyone, whether or not they have
incurred the cost of casting a ballot. The best explanation for political
voting is a cultural one-people like to vote because it makes them feel
good.
While civic culture and feelings might lead a person to vote in a
political election, this seems implausible as an explanation of corporate
voting. Instead, most shareholders are motivated by economic incentives.
So if shareholders vote, we would expect that they have some economic
99. Jensen & Meckling, supranote 30, at 308-10.
100. For presidential election registered voter turnout, see National Voter Turnout in Federal
Elections: 1960-2012, INFOPLEASE.COM, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781453.html (last visited
Aug. 15, 2014).
101. DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A
CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 47-48 (1994). But cf Suzanne Lohmann, The
Poverty of Green and Shapiro, in THE RATIONAL CHOICE CONTROVERSY: ECONOMIC MODELS OF
POLITICS RECONSIDERED 127, 143 (Jeffrey Friedman ed., Yale Univ. Press 1996) (1995) (questioning
Green and Shapiro's models showing that rational choice predicts zero voter turnout).
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reason to do so. Indeed, certain features of corporate voting mitigate the
problems associated with political voting. For example, shareholders can
increase their influence by accumulating shares, thereby increasing voting's
expected benefits and reducing its uncertainties. This can make voting
economically rational if its costs are not too high. This strategy only helps
to a point, though: shareholders have finite wealth, which limits their
ability to buy shares, while legal obstacles, such as the poison pill rules,
may further effectively limit share ownership.102 Moreover, there remains a
free-riding problem-gains flowing from a successful vote go to all
shareholders, even nonvoters, while the costs are only borne by the actual
voters.
How high are the costs of voting in a corporate election? It is costly to
gather the information needed to make an informed vote, even though the
costs are reduced by the SEC's mandatory disclosure rules.103 For
shareholders, the number of votes multiplies with the number of portfolio
companies they own. In addition, if a shareholder hopes to win, he or she
must incur substantial extra costs to coordinate and persuade other
shareholders. As a result, individual shareholders, who made up the bulk of
the shareholder base in Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardner C. Means theory of
the corporation, have historically had little reason to vote." Would the rise
of institutional investors in the late-twentieth century help overcome the
collective action problems that plagued individual shareholders?' We turn
102. The poison pill limits stockholders from accumulating large stakes in companies without
board approval. Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348-49 (Del. 1985).
103. On the other side of the table, issuer costs are increased by SEC proxy rules, although the
advent of e-proxy might act to lower them. Amendments to Rules Requiring Internet Availability of
Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9108, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 240 (Feb. 22, 2010) available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-9108.pdf (requiring issuers and other persons soliciting
proxies to post proxy materials on an Internet website and making other changes to address lower
response rates since adoption of e-proxies).
104. Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom andfor What Ends is CorporateManagementResponsible?, in
THE CORPORATION INMODERN SOCIETY 46,48-49 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959).
105. This balancing sheds light on why institutional ownership fell short of the potential that some
academics initially saw for it. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 812-20 (1992); Ronald S. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agendafor InstitutionalInvestors, 43 STAN. L. REV.
863, 863-65 (1991). Even Professor Berle at one point saw the potential for institutions and reducing
agency costs, although he later pulled back. Compare William W. Bratton, Berle and Means
Reconsidered at the Century's Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 752 (2001) (quoting from Berle's 1928 book
suggesting institutions gather many small holdings so that protection would be worthwhile), with
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, ShareholderPrimacy's CorporatistOrigins: Adolf Berle
and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 143 (2008) (describing how Berle's position in 1954
differed from that of 1928, as he acknowledged that his earlier position substituted institutional
managers for corporate investors without having solved the problem of separation of ownership and
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next to that topic.
1. Institutional Investors' Dominance Today and the Centrality of
Retirement Plans
Most voters in American corporations are not real people, a fact that
profoundly affects the voting process in the corporate setting. Indeed, more
than 70 percent of the shares of the largest American corporations are held
by institutions, particularly mutual funds and pension funds. 106 These
institutions are usually intermediaries: they hold title to the stock, but the
person who will gain or lose from the governance decisions relating to the
corporation is a beneficiary. This means that the separation of ownership
and control identified by Berle and Means in the 1930s has given way to a
further separation within ownership in which institutions, acting as agents,
exercise shareholder power.
Particularly important for our purposes, most of these institutional
shares are in various forms of retirement plans, a fact that reflects the
particular way the United States has chosen to fund its workers' retirement.
Table 1 shows that private company pension funds, state and local pension
funds, and mutual funds, all of which are largely holding retirement
monies, comprise about three-fourths of the institutional holdings of equity
in American corporations. Regulatory funding requirements and tax
deferral have swelled dollars available to these plans, as described below.
In turn, the particular characteristics of these retirement plans shape their
incentives to participate in corporate governance, such as voting, as
described in the following section.

control).
106. CONFERENCE BD., supra note 9, at 22 tbl.10, 27 tbl.13. The number is smaller if the
denominator is equity in all American corporations. See FED. RESERVE BD., ZI FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS
OF THE U.S.: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS
FIRST QUARTER 2014 at 100 tbl.L.213 (2014), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/zl/Current/zl.pdf (reporting the institutions listed in Table I as owning about 55 percent of
corporate equity, after excluding holdings of U.S. equity held by foreign residents). That number likely
understates the percentage of institutional holdings, since the non-institutional "household" category,
which acts as a default category, sweeps in hedge funds and not-for-profits which are not otherwise
separately broken out. This removes another 6 percent from the household number that should best be
included in the institution total. See id. at 66 tbl.L.100 n.l (noting that the household sector includes
domestic hedge funds, private equity funds, and personal trusts).
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1. Institutional Ownership of Equity in American Corporations

Type of InstitutionalHolder

Equity Holdings (in billions
of dollars)

Private Pension Funds

$2,517.3 (15.6%)

State & Local Pension Funds

$2,294.5(14.2%)

Mutual Funds (Including Closed End Funds)

$7,057.4 (43.7%)

Exchange Traded Funds

$1,449.9 (9.0%)

Insurance Companies

$2,134.3 (13.2%)

Other (for example, Depository Institutions,
Brokers/Dealers, Government's Outside Pension Plans
Total

$701.5 (4.3%)

$16,154.9

Source: FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 106 at 100 tbl.L.213 (after excluding holding of U.S. equity
foreign residents).

The United States has long provided tax deferral treatment for money
in retirement plans 0 7 and employers have had multiple reasons to provide
retirement benefits. 08 But in post-World War II America, retirement
policy, such as it was, did not center on investments in equity: social
security was funded out of tax dollars, and employer-funded private
pension plans were growing but looked to the corporation's cash flow for
funding as much as to separate funds set aside and invested in equity
investments.1 09 And institutions were a much smaller presence; in 1950, for
107. Government tax policy imposes no immediate tax liability on income earned in qualified
plans, with individual beneficiaries only taxed upon their receipt of funds after retirement. I.R.C.

§401(k)

(2012) (discussing cash and deferred arrangements). See also PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA:
PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 212-15 (2010) (describing ERISA participation standards).

When income tax rates rise, this benefit to tax-deferred retirement plans becomes larger. See
Kristian Rydqvist, Joshua Spizman & Ilya Strebulaev, Government Policy and Ownership of Equity
Securities 111 J. FIN. ECON. 70, 71 (2014) (showing the trend toward indirect ownership of stock and
linking it to the incentive of higher marginal tax rates that push investors to hold assets in tax deferred
vehicles).
108. Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of ShareholderPrimacy,43 SETON HALL L.
REv. 909, 921-22 (2013) (positing that large employers introduced pension plans because unions and
employees favored them when labor was scarce, since "generous pension plans were thought to secure
union support of labor peace," with defined benefit plans creating an incentive to stay in the same firm
until retirement).
109. In some other countries, retirement planning continues to rely more on these non-equity
sources than in the United States. To the extent that the government is the primary source for worker
retirement through current revenues and taxes, this institutional ownership of shares will not be present.
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example, institutions owned only about 6 percent of the total equity in
American corporations.1 10
Regulatory funding requirements included in the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") in 1974,"' dramatically
shifted this approach as Congress required employers to meet minimum
funding levels and hold retirement monies in a separate trust fund.' 12
Pension fund assets skyrocketed" 3 and a large segment of these assets
found their way into equities, which seemed to offer the best chance to
generate the growth in returns necessary to pay temporally remote
retirement obligations.114
The retirement plans in Table 1 divide into two groups-defined
benefit plans and defined contribution plans-reflecting how retirement
benefits accrue (and also leading to particular differences in incentives and
conflicts that affect governance and voting as discussed in the next
section). In a defined benefit plan, the employer sets aside money with a
promise to pay a specified amount to employees during their retirement.'
In a defined contribution plan, the employer's retirement contribution each
pay period goes into a separate account for each employee. Upon
retirement, the employee would get as much or as little as the contributions
had produced; thus, the risk of the market returns is on the shareholder and
See id. at 965 ("In the Continental European jurisdictions, public transfers (that is, public pensions)
dominate.").
110. CONFERENCE BD., supra note 9, at 22 tbl.10, 27 tbl.13.
ill. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29
U.S.C.). See STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS: THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS

228 (1997) (discussing the enactment of ERISA and its effects).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (requiring actuarial-determined annual payments and plans to pay down
prior unfunded obligations).
113. The share of American GDP made up of pension assets has been between 42 and 47 percent
over the last fifteen years, an increase from about 15 percent in 1975. See Christopher Chantrill, US
Gross
Domestic
Product
GDP
History,
US
GOVERNMENT
SPENDING,
http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/usgdphistory (last visited Aug. 18, 2014). Just in the 1980s,
total pension fund assets increased 350 percent. CONFERENCE BD., supra note 9, at tbl.12 (showing an
increase in pension fund assets from $871 billion to $3.023 trillion between 1980 and 1990).
114. See SASS, supra note 111, at 224-25; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 13, at 880 ("Although
plainly unintentional, the U.S. requirement-that a pension promise must be supported by assets held in
trust rather than by a book entry on a corporate balance sheet-both generated and concentrated very
large amounts of funds that would be invested in the capital markets by a class of fiduciaries on behalf
of future retirees.").
115. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 455 n.5
(2004) (explaining the operation of defined benefit plan). Their dominance in retirement planning prior
to ERISA is documented in MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS: AN INSIDER'S VIEW 117
(2008) ("It cannot be emphasized too strongly that congressional draftsmen of ERISA were concerned
almost exclusively with defined benefit ... plans. .. .").
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not the company.116
Defined benefit plans, reflected in the first two lines of Table 1,
include traditional company pension plans for their employees,"' 7 plans
established by state and local governments for their employees'
retirement,"' and multi-employer plans in the unionized sector of the work
force.1 1 9 Defined contribution plans are often invested in mutual funds,
with employees usually being given a handful of specific fund alternatives
set out in the plan (based on employer-provided choices after negotiating
with various fund providers). In each of these forms, shares are titled in the
name of the retirement plan, which gives the plan the right to vote. 120
ERISA accelerated a dramatic shift in retirement funding from defined
benefit plans to defined contribution plans.121 Employer worries about
fiduciary obligations written into ERISA and the employer's potential cash
requirements if earnings on the defined benefit plan were insufficient to
fund the benefits that had been promised, shifted plans toward the defined
contribution format.122 By the end of the 2000s, assets in defined
contribution plans, which had been roughly equal to the amount in defined
116. Zelinsky, supranote 115, at 458-61.
117. In some high-profile American companies as late as the turn of the twenty-first century, most
pension plan assets consisted of stock in the company itself; during the succeeding decade, and in the
wake of scandals such as Enron, the mean share of company stock in plans declined by more than half
from 19 percent to 5 percent See David Millon, Enron and the Dark Side of Worker Ownership, I
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 113, 117-20 (2002); ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDtN, COMING UP
SHORT: THE CHALLENGE OF 401(k) PLANS 113 (2004).

118. Defined benefit plans invest in assets beyond equity and often have not made great use of
equity. The California State Employees Pension System, for example, could not have invested more
than 25 percent of its assets in equity until 1984. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 17 (repealed 1984) ("[T]he
Legislature may authorize the investment of moneys of any public pension or retirement fund, not to
exceed 25 percent of the assets of such fund determined on the basis of cost in the common stock or
share. . . ."). See also Gelter, supranote 108, at 959 ("[M]any pension funds held few or no equities in
their portfolios until the mid 1990s.").
119. See Labor Management Relations ("Taft-Hartley") Act section 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. §
186(c)(5)(B) (2012) (specifying equal representation of employers and employees on the board of
union-run pension plans receiving payments from employers). See generally Stewart J. Schwab &
Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: ShareholderActivism by Labor Unions, 96
MICH. L. REv. 1018, 1075-77 (1998) (describing the origin, structure and use of Taft-Hartley plans).
120. Cf id Employee Stock Ownership Plans, unlike pension plans, generally are not pooled
investments and are required to provide pass-through voting to their participant. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 409(E)(2) (2012).
121.
EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW THE DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA 38-39 (2007) (describing how ERISA led the US

down the path to a "defined contribution society").
122. See Gelter, supra note 108, at 948 ("[ERISA] probably accelerated the trend toward more
mobility, less firm-specific human capital, and possibly more general or industry-specific human
capital.").
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benefit plans two decades earlier, were four times as large.' 23 Much of that
new money was placed in mutual funds,124 which also included funds from
self-employed workers as federal law extended tax-deferred status to
Individual Retirement Accounts ("IRAs"). 125
Retirement plans today hold at least half of funds invested in equity
mutual funds and probably a good bit more. 126 Individual investors also
invest in mutual funds outside of their tax-favored retirement plans,
attracted to the same low-cost way to gain diversification even without the
tax deferral 27 (although these non-retirement plan investments are more
likely to be in non-equity mutual funds).128 Institutions also invest in
mutual funds. Title to all these shares is in the name of the fund.
In Table 1, there are some other categories of institutional owners of
equity that do not directly hold retirement funds, for example, insurance
companies, depository institutions, and foundations, including those for
college and university endowments. 129 However, these institutions possess
only a small minority of equity securities.
123. See id at 924-25 figs.1-3 (graphing the reversal of positions of defined benefit plans and
defined contribution plans).
124. FINK, supra note 115, at 132 ("It is impossible to overestimate the importance of [individual
retirement accounts] and defined contribution plans to the mutual fund industry.")
125. Congress authorized self-employed individuals to establish tax-favored retirement plans then
called Keogh plans in 1962 and expanded this favorable tax treatment multiple times in the decades that
followed. Id. at 112-16. Federal regulations now permit individuals who have left their employers to
roll over their funds in an IRA and preserve tax-deferred growth of their retirement savings, leading to
growth of this segment of the market. See 26 U.S.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(v) (2012) (permitting a tax-free
rollover of an employee retirement benefit to an IRA).
126.

See INV. CO. INST., 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND

ACTIVITIES INTHE U.S. INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 9 fig.1.1, 22, 25 fig.2.1, 133 (53d ed. 2013)
[hereinafter ICI FACT BOOK 2013] (demonstrating that assets in mutual funds totaled $13.045 trillion,
and of that amount, one-third or roughly $4.3 trillion was in domestic equity funds). Retirement plans'
investment in domestic equity was $2.159 trillion, or more than half of the amount invested in equity
funds. Id. at 133 fig.7.23 (providing the total amount of mutual fund retirement assets invested in
equity). The retirement plans' portion of equity mutual funds is undoubtedly higher, since the
computation above does not count retirement account assets in hybrid funds (about half of the size of
mutual funds) which include a mix of equities and fixed-income securities including the bulk of target
date and lifecycle funds. Id.
127. Portfolio theory, developed by financial economists over the last five decades, has shown
diversified investments like a mutual fund can reduce risk as compared to non-diversified investments
at a low cost, such that most investors prefer the built-in diversification of a mutual fund to creating
their own diversified portfolio. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 13, at 885 (noting that households
increasingly invest through diversification-providing intermediaries-mutual funds).
128. See ICI FACT BOOK 2013, supra note 126, at 134-36, 135 fig.7.24 (demonstrating college
plans and annuities outside retirement plans).
129. There was a time when banks were a prime institutional holder of funds invested in equity,
including estates and trust, but they now own only a portion of the small slice of equity owned by
financial institutions, set out in Table 1.
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Two categories of institutional investors-asset managers and hedge
funds-are not separately broken out in Table 1, but can be significant
players in corporate governance. Asset management firms invest money
from both individuals and institutions in a variety of asset categories,
including exchange traded funds or alternative investments. For example
BlackRock Institutional Trust Company, N.A., the largest asset manager in
America, is the first- or second-largest shareholder in ExxonMobil,
Microsoft, Apple, and General Electric.' 30 The multi-trillion dollars worth
of assets under its management are split among different categories, with
more than a trillion in mutual funds and a trillion managed for other
institutional investors. 131 Asset management can create another layer of
intermediation for voting, with the asset manager serving as the owner of
the shares, or as an agent for institutional clients investing money on behalf
of individual beneficiaries.
Hedge funds include a variety of different entities pursuing a broad
range of investment strategies, often taking higher risks to achieve aboveaverage market returns. While some of their investors are individuals
investing their own money, two-thirds of hedge fund capital comes from
institutional investors-$1.49 trillion in 2012-and this segment is growing
rapidly.13 2 What is relevant for our project is the subset of hedge funds
whose strategy is to actively buy and sell equity, who we will call activist
hedge funds. Equity investments for hedge funds, estimated to total $600
billion, remain lumped in the default category of households in the
government reports reflected in Table 1.133 Logically, as they should be
included in the institutional data, Table 1 understates institutional
ownership by that amount.134 Like asset managers, activist hedge funds
130. CONFERENCE BD., supra note 9, at 30-32.
131. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 13, at 886 n.79 (presenting self-reported data disclosed on
eVestment.com, a site providing data and analytical tools for investors); The Monolith and the Markets,
ECONOMIST (Dec. 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21591 164-getting-15-trillionassets-single-risk-management-system-huge-achievement (reporting that passive investment products,
such as exchange-traded funds, account for 64 percent of BlackRock's assets under management).
132. See Adam Brown, Institutional Investors to Boost Allocations to Hedge Funds, IR MAG.
(May 16, 2013), available at http://www.irmagazine.con/articles/buy-side/19493/institutionalinvestors-boost-allocations-hedge-funds/ (referencing CITI PRIME FIN., INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN
HEDGE FUNDS: EVOLVING INVESTOR PORTFOLIO CONSTRUCTION DRIVES PRODUCT CONVERGENCE,
(June 2012) [hereinafter Cri PRIME FINANCE REPORT], available at http://www.citibank.com/
transactionservices3/homepage/demo/IIHF June2012/.).
133. See supra note 106 for a discussion of hedge funds as being included within the default
category of households in Table 1, and not the category of institutions.
134. Hedge funds were not required to register with federal regulators until Dodd-Frank; that
legislation blocks the public disclosure of data now collected. Reporting by Investment Advisers to
Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF,
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create an additional layer of intermediation-the hedge funds invest money
from institutional investors, who in turn are investing funds received for the
benefit of individual shareholders. Hedge funds hold title to the shares that
they have purchased and vote them.
2. Why Don't Most Intermediaries Care About Voting?
Most institutions would often prefer not to vote. For example, the
issue on the ballot, such as a Rule 14a-8 social responsibility proposal,
might not affect firm value, so that the institution's vote produces no
benefit.135 More generally, as John C. Coffee, Jr. has observed, the
"expected gains from most governance issues are small, deferred, and
received by investors, while the costs are potentially large, immediate, and
borne by money managers." 36
Consider the typical mutual fund's business model. These funds
compete to become one of the retirement investment options that an
employer presents to its workers. Applying modern portfolio theory,
company retirement plans typically seek to provide their beneficiaries with
options to create a diversified portfolio at a low cost. In choosing among
the proffered investment options, individual beneficiaries focus on the
relative performance of a particular fund as compared to alternative funds.
They are likely to choose the fund that offers the best relative performance
record.
From the fund's perspective, any monies spent on voting may reduce
marginally the firm's relative performance compared to its competitors.' 37
Costs incurred to gather information and formulate an informed vote
reduce the active fund's bottom line, while any benefits resulting from the
vote can be realized by competitors holding the same stock who do not
Exchange Act Release No. IA-3308, 17 C.F.R. §§ 275, 279 (Oct. 31, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011 /ia-3308.pdf.
135. Some institutions, for example labor-affiliated and state and local government pension funds,
sponsor a disproportionate number of shareholder proposals, while other institutions sponsor few of
those. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
136. John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1328 (1991). See also Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The NonCorrelationBetween Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 234
(2002).
137. Mutual funds are not likely to be a large percentage investor in any one company because
exceeding 10 percent, for example, will eliminate their preferred flow through tax advantage and may
open them to possible liability for insider trading. See Mark Roe, PoliticalElements in the Creationofa
Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1469, 1474-76 (1991) (describing the political reasons
behind the tax framework for restricting a mutual fund's ownership of a company to 10 percent).
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incur voting costs. 138 Mutual funds will prefer to focus on, "delivering lowcost, high-powered diversification and scale economies in active
management . .. [which creates]

significant problems in the efficient

assignment of governance rights." 39 In the words of Ronald J. Gilson and
Jeffrey N. Gordon, mutual funds will be "rationally reticent," reluctant to
invest resources in voting because at best it is irrelevant to getting business,
and at worst it costs them business if they alienate any corporate plan
sponsors who determine which mutual fund option to offer their
beneficiaries. 140
Defined benefit plans have better incentives to vote because their
trustees know that any improved investment returns resulting from voting
will reduce the amount that the sponsoring employer needs to contribute to
fund the requisite payouts. These heightened voting incentives can be
muted, at least for a private company, to the extent that bankruptcy
potentially allows some firms to escape liability for their underfunded
pension obligations.
Unlike mutual funds, state government pension funds do not compete
for investment funds because state law mandates the flow of deposits into
the fund and locks in deposited funds. As with other defined benefit plans,
they have some incentives to use the vote so as to increase returns and
thereby limit the amount that the particular governmental entity
contributes. This incentive is muted if politicians can "kick the can" of
underfunded pension liabilities down the road to the next generation of

voters and taxpayers. 14 1
Insurance companies also put money in equities to generate funds to
pay distant claims. As with defined benefit plans, the insurer commits to
pay a fixed amount at a future time in exchange for bearing the risk that its
investment returns will cover those claims. Voting that increases
investment returns is therefore beneficial.
138. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 13, at 890 (noting that "absolute performance will play a
secondary role").
139. Id at 895.
140. Id
141. Natalya Shnitser, Funding Discipline for U.S. Public Pension Plans: An Empirical Analysis
of Institutional Design 9-11 (Sept. 1, 2013), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=2151556 (unpublished manuscript) (describing how underfunding levels of pension plans
varies with factors such as political control). See also Mark Peters, Pension Pinch Busts City Budgets,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Nov.
5,
2013,
6:05
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SBl0001424052702303471004579163602529729442 (discussing the effects of a current crisis in local
and state funding of these plans).
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Even if the fund has an incentive to vote, managers who make
decisions for the fund may have weak personal incentives to invest in
voting to increase firm value. Partly this stems from government
regulation. The Investment Advisers Act, for example, prevents the general
use of incentive fee structures in mutual funds.142 Markets also have an
effect: fund managers tend to be evaluated on metrics that can discourage
an active use of voting. For example, The Big Short described how the
managers of a German insurance company took a terribly timed long
position on housing derivatives because they were being paid based on
assets under management rather than based on performance.143
Overall, the result is that institutional investors prefer not to vote and
are not activist shareholders. Company pension plans are the least active in
corporate governance.14 4 Government employees' pension plans are
relatively more active in voting, although their focus has been on more
generic governance proposals and some specific social and political
shareholder proposals. 145 Historically, insurance companies and
foundations have been relatively less active in voting and corporate
governance. Generally, mutual funds have been less active in voting and
corporate governance issues than might be expected for a concentrated
group owning 25 percent of equities in many large corporations, although
in some instances they have worked with activist hedge funds.146
Activist hedge funds are different from the institutional investors
because of their focus on corporate governance as an investment
strategy.14 7 They typically acquire a sizeable equity position and seek to
§ 80b-5(a)(1)

(2012).

142.

Investment Advisers Act section 205, 15 U.S.C.

143.

MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 200-19 (2011).

144.
See, e.g., The Manhattan Inst.'s Ctr. for Legal Policy, 2013 Proxy Season Review, PROXY
MONITOR, available at http://www.proxymonitor.org/Forms/2013Finding5.aspx ("As was the case in
2012 and throughout the 2006-13 period, only 1 percent of shareholder proposals in 2013 were
introduced by shareholders without a tie to organized labor or a social, religious, or policy purpose.").
145. See Gretchen Morgenson, New Momentum for Change in CorporateBoard Elections, N.Y.
TIMES (July 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/business/new-momentum-for-change-incorporate-board-elections.html (including list of state plans supporting Harvard's shareholder rights
project). They have also been more willing than other institutional investors to act as class
representatives in shareholder litigation. Michael Perino, InstitutionalActivism Through Litigation: An
EmpiricalAnalysis of Public Pension Fund Participationin Securities Class Actions, 9 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 368, 375 (2012) (noting that public and union pension funds were listed as lead plaintiffs
in 34.4 percent of filed cases).
146. See, e.g., Susanne Craig, The Giant ofShareholders, Quietly Stirring,N.Y. TIMES (May 18,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/business/blackrock-a-shareholding-giant-is-quietlystirring.html (noting that BlackRock, the largest shareholder in more than 1400 U.S. listed companies,
has never sponsored a shareholder proposal).
147. Bray et al., supra note 12, at 1749, 1750 tbl.III, 1751 (providing data and analysis of the
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influence the board to change corporate policy: sometimes seeking to
produce more cash quickly;14 8 other times engaging in merger arbitrage,14 9
or initiating a change in control transaction. 50 Hedge funds identify
governance initiatives where active monitoring might be valuable, which
institutions can then decide to support with their voting power.' Hedge
funds are similar to other institutions, though, because they are the record
owners for the shares they own, while the beneficial ownership accrues to
the investors in the fund, creating the additional layer of agency costs in
voting previously mentioned.152
3. Government Responses to Weak Institutional Voting Incentives
Voting in American democracy has always been voluntary, and
citizens that fail to vote face at worst mild social ostracism. 1 3 Not so for
institutional investors who hold equity securities in corporations. In 1988,
the Department of Labor ("DOL"), the agency responsible for
administering and enforcing ERISA (and thus the regulator of defined
benefit plans), declared that "the fiduciary act of managing plan assets
which are shares of corporate stock would include the voting of
proxies ... ."1 54 Plan trustees or managers suddenly faced potential
regulatory sanctions if they failed to vote shares their institutions held. In a
later codification of this mandate, the DOL added that shareholder activism
is consistent with a fiduciary's obligations under ERISA where the
responsible fiduciary concludes that there is a reasonable expectation
that such monitoring or communication with management, by the plan
alone or together with other shareholders, will enhance the economic
characteristics found in target companies of activist hedge funds).
148. See, e.g., CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 279-81 (2d
Cir. 2011) (describing efforts of shareholder investment funds to get the board of a railroad to
implement policies providing more cash to shareholders).
149. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375,
1423 (2007) ("The sixteen additional cases involve shareholder intervention respecting a single
transaction. Such sideline input from Wall Street has been a fact of life in the acquisitions market for
three decades, generated by merger arbitrageurs seeking to make sure the target gets sold at the
maximum possible amount.").
150. See, for instance, the Dell transaction described supra note 5 and accompanying text.
151. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 13, at 896-902.
152. There is a third level of agency costs created by hedge fund investing, as many institutions
invest in hedge funds through funds of funds.
153. Voting is mandatory in some other countries. See Note, The Case for Compulsory Voting in
the United States, 121 HARV. L. REv. 591, 592 (2007) (noting that twenty-four nations have
compulsory voting in political elections).
154. Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Pension & Welfare Benefits Admin.
of the U.S. Dep't of Labor, to Helmuth Fandl, Chair of the Retirement Bd., Avon Products, Inc., 1988
WL 897696 *2 (Feb. 23, 1988).
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value of the plan's investment in the corporation, after taking into
account the costs involved. 55
In 2003, the SEC extended a similar rule to mutual funds, defined
contribution plans, and other entities holding votes for the beneficial
interests of others.156
Under these rules, an investment adviser has a fiduciary duty to vote
stock using policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure proxies
are voted in the best interests of the clients. 5 7 Both the DOL and SEC rules
reflect agency cost concerns: agents who vote for beneficiaries may be
failing to exercise a valuable part of the shareholder investment. Additional
SEC regulations require mutual funds to disclose how they exercise the
vote. 158
These regulations changed the pattern of voting, but enforcement
remains weak. An Inspector General's report on the DOL program
questioned its effectiveness, noting that few resources were devoted to it
and that the DOL lacked authority to assess penalties for violations.' 59
Under the SEC rules, there was an enforcement action in 2009.'60
Separately, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of votes
held. Rule 14a-8, promulgated in 1942, has long permitted precatory votes
on certain shareholder proposals.161 Today there are hundreds of these
proposals every year, covering social responsibility issues and corporate
155. Interpretative Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written Statement
of Investment Policy Including Proxy Voting Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. §2509.08.2 (Oct. 17, 2008),
superseding 59 Fed. Reg. 32607 (June 23, 1994). The Bulletin also notes: "Plan fiduciaries risk
violating the exclusive purpose rule [of economic value maximization for shareholders] when they
exercise their fiduciary authority in an attempt to further legislative, regulatory or public policy issues
through the proxy process."
156. Final Rule: Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release No. IA-2106, 17
C.F.R. §275 (Jan. 31, 2003) [hereinafter Investment Advisers Act Release], available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2106.htm.
157. See supra notes 154-156 and accomoanvinR text.
158. See Rule 30bl-4 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 270.30bl-4 (requiring
mutual funds to disclose their complete voting records annually, including portfolio securities they
hold); Annual Report of Proxy Voting Record of Registered Management Investment Company (Form
N-PX), availableat https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-px.pdf.
159. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR: OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., PROXY-VOTING MAY NOT BE
SOLELY

FOR

THE

ECONOMIC

BENEFIT

OF

RETIREMENT

PLANS

2

(2011),

available at

http://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2011/09-11-001-12-121 .pdf.
160. Intech Inv. Mgt. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. IA-2872, 95 SEC Docket 2265 (May 7,
2009), available at http://www.sec.govlitigation/admin/2009/ia-2872.pdf (regarding a fund that
engaged a proxy advisory firm to vote proxies in accordance with AFL-CIO proxy recommendations in
an effort to maintain and attract clients, but failed to disclose material conflict).
161.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.
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governance concerns, such as the removal of staggered boards and poison
pills.162 Furthermore, Dodd-Frank extended precatory shareholder votes to
executive compensation (Say on Pay). 163 As a result, shareholders vote on
more issues than ever before and most institutional intermediaries are
required to vote on all of them. 1 6
4. Responses from the Market: Proxy Advisory Firms
The institutions' urgent need to be informed about these votes, and
their lack of incentive to spend much money to do so, created an opening
for a new set of agents in the voting process-proxy advisory firms that
focus on providing information and voting services to institutional
investors. These firms exploit economies of scale by collecting information
about each of the votes held at public companies and then distributing them
to each of the many institutional investors owning shares in that company.
Their efficiencies extend to tracking and submitting the tens of thousands
of votes cast each year by each institution. Moreover, these advisory firms
have developed expertise on governance issues.
The cost of proxy advisory firms' services can be kept down by
spreading them over many institutions that hold stock in companies in
162. See, e.g., The Manhattan Inst.'s Ctr. for Legal Policy, 2013 Proxy Season Scorecard,PROXY
MONITOR, http://www.proxymonitor.org/ScoreCard2013.aspx (last visited Aug. 18, 2014)
163. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank"), Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1375, 1899 (2010) (adding new section 14A to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934). Ancillary regulatory changes, such as the New York Stock Exchange's elimination of brokers'
freedom to vote undirected shares for their clients in uncontested elections, have further enhanced the
voting role of institutional shareholders. See David A. Katz & Laura A. MacIntosh, A Seismic Shift in
Mechanics of Electing Directors,N.Y.L.J., July 27, 2006, at 5 (describing the change as a "massive
shift of voting power from brokers to institutions").
164. In 2013, two commentators suggested that "[tihe SEC should reconsider the entirety of the
shareholder voting process, including the mandate that institutional investors participate in all corporate
votes." David F. Larcker & Allan L. McCall, Proxy Advisers Don't Help Shareholders,WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 8, 2013, 6:51 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230349780457924184
2269425358. While a full examination of this issue lies outside the scope of this Article, we note
several potential problems with their approach. First, as we noted above, there is a collective action
problem in the provision of shareholder monitoring that the government's voting mandate solves:
eliminating the mandated vote would result in suboptimal levels of shareholder monitoring. Second, if
institutional investors choose not to participate in the voting process, several practical problems are
likely to develop. For example, companies may no longer be able to obtain quorums at their annual
meetings for the conduct of routine business. In addition, the absence of institutional investors from
voting would increase the relative voting power of shareholders that have noneconomic interests, such
as the sponsors of many social responsibility proposals under Rule 14a-8. Third, to the extent that
institutional shareholders do not calculate the long-term value effects of voting on certain matters, they
may fail to support proposals that increase firm value in the long run. The current government mandate
requires them to make these determinations.
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which similar issues will arise.165 Institutional investors have noticed: as
TIAA-CREF, one of the largest institutional investors, stated, "Though we
dedicate a significant amount of resources to corporate governance research
and the voting of proxies, we still would have difficulty processing the
80,000 plus unique agenda items voted by our staff annually without
utilizing [proxy firm] research."l 66
A small group of proxy advisory firms that sells information about
corporate voting as well as voting recommendations to institutional
investors has grown up over the last twenty-five years.167 The origins of the
industry were in the corporate governance movement of the 1980s, spurred
at times by profit opportunities and enhanced by the regulatory changes just
discussed. Institutional Shareholder Services is the oldest, best-known
proxy advisory firm, and has the largest current client base. One of its
founders, Robert Monks, had been an administrator of the DOL's ERISA
program prior to the founding of ISS and was a key player in the
development of the DOL's decision to treat proxy voting as a plan asset. 168
It has 1100 clients, including most of the largest mutual funds, and offices
in the U.S. and around the globe.169 In addition to its advice on proxy
voting, it has a large consulting business advising clients on governance
issues. 170
165.

See BEW & FIELDS, supranote 17, at 1-2.

166. Comment Letter from Jonathan Feigelson, Senior Vice President, Gen. Counsel & Head of
Corp. Govemance, Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. & College Retirement Equities Fund
("TIAA-CREF") to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, On Concept Release on
the U.S. Proxy System in Release No. 34-62495, at 5 (Nov. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-1 0/s7l410-263.pdf.
167. This has been described as "a classic oligopoly structure" in an earlier version of a paper by
David Larcker, Allan McCall, and Gaizka Ormazabal. David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall & Gaizka
Ormazabal, Proxy Advisory Firms and Stock Option Repricing 2 n.6 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate
Governance, Working Paper No. 100, Apr. 9, 2012), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1811130## (subsequently published as David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall &
Gaizka Ormazabal, Proxy Advisory Finns and Stock Option Repricing, 56 J. ACCT. & ECON. 149
(2013)).
168. Robert Monks and ISS co-founder Nell Minow also formed Lens, Inc., an early entry in
activist investment. Minnow said "We wanted to be a critic on the stage rather than in the audiencethe kind of entity that organizations like the ISS and the IRRC write about." Lucy Alexander, Profile:
Nell Minow, IR MAG. (Feb. 1, 1997), http://www.irmagazine.com/articles/people-careers/17680/profilenell-minow/. More recently Monks and Minow have run GMI Ratings, a firm that focuses not on proxy
recommendations but on ratings more generally, including govemance metrics.
169. About
ISS
Corporate
Services,
ISS
CORPORATE
SERVICES,
http://www.isscorporateservices.com/about (last visited Aug. 19, 2014). ISS was sold to private equity
firm Vestar Capital Partners in 2014, its third ownership change in seven years. Liz Hoffman, Vestar to
Buy ISS for $364 Million, WALL ST. J., (Mar 18, 2014, 5:19 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SBl0001424052702304017604579447013092286156.
170. This consulting business has generated some concems about potential conflicts of interest.
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Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC's ("Glass Lewis") recent growth has made it
a very visible number two.' 7 1 It grew up after the SEC's 2003 expansion of
the voting obligations of mutual funds and has been owned since 2007 by
the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan, itself an institutional investor.17 2 Glass
Lewis has doubled its client base over the last half-decade, in part through
its 2010 acquisition of PROXY Governance.' 73
Proxy advisory firms have acquired an aura of great influence in proxy
voting, but their power may be overstated. ISS gained early prominence for
its perceived influence in the bitterly fought Hewlett-Packard acquisition of
Compaq in 2002.174 Corporations have complained about ISS's power,
citing anecdotal evidence that many shareholders vote immediately after
ISS makes a recommendation. 7 1 Several academic studies show a 15See infra Part II.B.2.
171. Ross Kerber, For Glass Lewis, More Proxy Clout Means More Heat, CHI. TRIB. (June 13,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-06-13/news/sns-rt-corporate-governanceglasslewis
2012),
lle8h763g-20120613_1_proxy-adviser-iss-clients (noting that in nine years Glass Lewis had gone from
a start-up to the chief rival of ISS).
172. In 2013, it sold 20 percent to another Canadian institutional investor, AIMCo. Press Release,
Ont. Tchr. Pension Plan, Teachers' Sells 20% Stake in Glass Lewis to AIMCo (Aug. 28, 2013),
availableat http://www.otpp.com/news/article/-/article/697097.
173. Press Release, Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC, Glass Lewis Announces Agreement with PGI (Dec.
20, 2010), available at http://www.glasslewis.com/about-glass-lewis/press-releases/. Smaller segments
of the market are held by Egan-Jones, owned by the Egan Jones Rating Agency, Inc., and Marco
Consulting Group, which has focused on advising Taft-Hartley firms.
174. Luisa Beltran, ISS Could Kill HP-Compaq, CNN MONEY (Mar. 4, 2002, 4:02 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2002/03/04/deals/isshp/index.htm ("A little known but very influential proxy
advisory firm could kill Hewlett-Packard Co.'s chances to succeed in its $22 billion takeover . . . .").
But see Luisa Beltran, ISS Backs HP-Compaq Merger, CNN.COM (EUROPE) (Mar. 5, 2002, 9:01 PM),
available at http://premium.europe.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/03/05/iss.hp/ ("Institutional Shareholder
Services issued an opinion late Tuesday backing Hewlett-Packard Co.'s $22 billion takeover of Compaq
Computer Corp.").
175. A comment letter from Douglas K. Chia, Assistant General Counsel and Corporate Secretary
of Johnson & Johnson, demonstrates that the number of shares voted within one business day after an
ISS report (and voted in accordance with the ISS recommendation) was more than four times larger
than the average shares voted per day during the five business days before the ISS report was published.
See Comment Letter from Douglas K. Chia, Assistant Gen. Counsel & Sec'y, Johnson & Johnson, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, on Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy
System in Release No. 34-62495 at 2 (Oct. 19, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s714-10/s71410-15.pdf.
A comment letter from IBM's vice president noting a similar pattern of voting emphasized that
the IBM voting bloc essentially controlled by ISS has more influence on the voting results
than IBM's largest shareholder. And this voting block is controlled by a proxy advisory firm
that has no economic stake in the company and has not made meaningful public disclosure
about its voting power, conflicts of interest or controls.
Comment Letter from Andrew Bonzani, Vice President, Assistant Gen. Counsel & Sec'y, IBM, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, on Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy
System in Release No. 34-62495 at 3 (Oct. 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s714-10/s71410-84.pdff
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30 percent correlation of shareholder voting with proxy advisory
recommendations.176 James Cotter, Alan Palmiter, and Randall Thomas
found that mutual funds tend to vote in line with ISS recommendations and
follow them more consistently than they do management
recommendations. 177
However, these correlations do not establish a causal link between the
outcome of a shareholder vote and an ISS recommendation. ISS develops
its policies in conjunction with its institutional clients, and during this
process clients give input to ISS about their views on corporate governance
issues, leading some academics to discount the independent effect of ISS's
recommendations.s7 8 Even so, Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri, and David
Oesch suggest some portion of voting results can be attributed to the
advisory firm.179
Some large institutional advisers have said they do not use proxy
advisory firms. BlackRock's head, for example, wrote:
Companies that focus only on gaining the support of proxy advisory
firms risk forgoing valuable and necessary engagements directly with
shareholders.... We reach our voting decisions independently of proxy
advisory firms on the basis of guidelines that reflect our perspective as a
fiduciary investor with responsibilities to protect the economic interests
of our clients.180
Other institutions use proxy advisers only for information collection.
The Council of Institutional Investors ("CII") noted that nine of its ten
largest member funds do not delegate voting decisions to a proxy adviser,
using instead their own voting guidelines. However, the CII supports their
use, stating that, "without proxy advisers, many pension plans176.

See infra notes 178-179. See generally KENNETH L. ALTMAN & JAMES F. BURKE (THE

ALTMAN GROUP), PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS: THE DEBATE OVER CHANGING THE REGULATORY

FRAMEWORK (Mar. 1, 2011), available at http://astfundsolutions.com/pdf/TAGSpecRptProxyAdv.pdf
(providing summary and analysis of comments submitted to the SEC regarding the influence of proxy
advisory firms on the proxy voting process).
177. James Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and Mutual Fund
Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010). But see Peter Iliev and Michelle Lowry, Are
Mutual Funds Active Voters? (Apr. 15, 2014), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2145398 (unpublished manuscript) (arguing that many mutual finds place
relatively little weight on proxy advisory services' voting recommendations).
178. Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?,
59 EMORY L.J. 869, 906 (2010) (suggesting that many overemphasize the influence of ISS and
estimating that its report shifts 6-10 percent of shareholder votes as opposed to figures of up to onethird in some other analyses).
179. Ertimur, Ferri & Oesch, supra note 11, at 979-80 (using the difference between voting
behavior of block and non-block institutional holders to suggest a floor of causation).
180. Craig, supranote 146, at 2.
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particularly smaller funds with limited resources-would have difficulty
managing their highly seasonal proxy voting responsibilities for the
thousands of companies in their portfolios."18 1
In sum, proxy advisory firms help their clients to lower their cost of
informed voting and to address collective action problems. They also have
some degree of influence over voting outcomes and suffer some conflicts
of interest.18 2
B. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OF INSTITUTIONAL INTERMEDIARIES, PROXY
ADVISORY FIRMS, AND HEDGE FUNDS

Conflicts of interest may lead institutional investors, hedge funds, and
even proxy advisory firms to cast votes to further their own interests at the
expense of their beneficiaries.1 8 1 When this happens, institutions may not
be voting to maximize shareholder value, and our theory of corporate
voting-which assumes that shareholders vote to maximize firm valuewill be undercut. In this section, we identify three significant types of
conflicts and potential policy solutions for each of them.
1. Institutional Investor Conflicts
Institutional investors' conflicts of interest vary by investor category.
For example, the three types of defined benefit plans-corporate pension
plans, state and local government pension plans, and multi-employer plans
in the unionized sector-have distinct sets of conflicts. In private pension
plans, company management picks the trustee who operates the plan, and
the trustee selects the outside managers that actually invest its capital. Both
are likely to want to please those who have appointed them,184 especially if
the plan holds a large block of the company's stock. These ties of the plan's
managers to company managers could affect voting. For example,
corporate pension plans may oppose shareholder initiatives to change
governance at other companies with a mentality of "There but for the grace
of God go I."
181. Comment Letter from Council of Institutional Investors, supranote 19, at 5.
182. We explore these conflicts more filly in Part II.B.2.
183. Jill Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from Control, 33
SEATTLE U. L. REv. 877, 887 (2010) ("Institutional intermediaries and their decision-makers hold a
variety of complex economic interests that challenge their incentive to maximize firm value.").
184. See, e.g., Investment Advisers Act Release, supra note 156, § I ("An adviser may have a
number of conflicts that can affect how it votes proxies. For example, an adviser (or its affiliate) may
manage a pension plan, administer employee benefit plans, or provide brokerage, underwriting,
insurance, or banking services to a company whose management is soliciting proxies. Failure to vote in
favor of management may harm the adviser's relationship with the company.").
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In government pension plans, those who run the plan may have a
different type of conflict. The fund trustees are often elected officials or
political appointees. For example, the New York City Comptroller, an
elected official, controls NYCERS, a large pension plan for city
employees.ss The political ambitions of the trustees may lead them to cast
votes to further their political objectives at the expense of pension plan
beneficiaries. As a result, these public sector funds may be more involved
in broader public policy issues, such as supporting social investments. 186
Outright corruption, or pay to play, is possible as well if prospective fund
managers and their proxy advisory firms use political contributions to gain
favor with those elected officials who allocate investment responsibilities at
these entities.
Labor-affiliated multi-employer pension plans must have "balanced"
boards of management and union representatives, but management's
trustees often cede authority for investment decisions to union trustees.187
The union trustees must balance the labor-organizing motives of unions
and their members' desire for improved wages and working conditions
against the more capitalist concern of generating higher returns to provide
for employees' future retirement benefits.' 8 In the 1990s, union-affiliated
pension plans became more active in governance as to shareholder
proposals. 8 9
Mutual funds' conflicts stem from employers' choices about which
185. The plans for California employees and teachers also have or have had elected officials in
management roles. See Fisch, supranote 183, at 883.
186. Id. at 881-82.
187. Management trustees are largely concerned with the size of their company's contributions to
the plan. These payments tend to be a fixed amount, so that these trustees have little incentive to get
further involved. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 119, at 1077 ("Despite the balanced board
membership, unions have tended to dominate these jointly managed funds. Indeed, it is '[o]ften . . . very
difficult to distinguish between the pension fund and the union.' One reason is that the union pension
funds have typically been funded through fixed contributions by the employer with the trustees of the
fund setting the pension levels. Whether the pension does well or poorly on its investment of such funds
does not impact the employer directly.").
188. Gelter, supra note 108, at 910-11 (describing labor's shift toward more shareholder friendly
policies as focus has moved from wealth created by human capital to wealth created by financial
capital). See also David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Union Activism: Do Union Pension Firms Act
Solely in the Interests of Beneficiaries?, STANFORD CLOSER LOOK SERIES 1-3, 5 Ex. 1 (2012)
(discussing pension fund shareholder activism), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/
30_UnionActivism.pdf.
189. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 119, at 1080. See also Richard Trumka, Multiemployer
Pension Plans, PLANSPONSOR MAG., Feb. 1998, available at http://www.plansponsor.com/
MagazineArticle.aspx?id=6442461269 (noting that multiemployer plans used voting rights to pursue
corporate governance proposals).
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options to provide employees in their tax-favored retirement plans.190
Employers can choose from a wide variety of funds and fund managers and
are loath to cast votes that might cause employers to cut off their access to
employees' retirement money."' Offsetting these worries is the fact that
the most successful fund families now control more than 70 percent of the
market for retirement plans,192 and these large funds know that the
retention of any one company's business is less critical to the fund's overall
success.
SEC rules requiring policies and procedures by investment advisers to
show shares are voted in the best interest of plan beneficiaries specify that
such policies and procedures must explain how the fund resolves material
conflicts of interest.193 The SEC's release accompanying the rules lists
various means advisers might use to ensure proxy votes are voted in the
client's best interest, including basing votes on a predetermined policy, or
basing votes on a predetermined policy based on recommendations of an
independent third party such as a proxy advisory firm.194
Our theory assumes that institutions can overcome their conflicts of
interest and cast their proxies to maximize the value of the firm. Chinese
walls, such as those described below for ISS,1 95 can be a productive
addition in institutions as well. The SEC's rules and regulations provide a
strong foundation for ensuring that occurs if they are adequately enforced,
although the relatively small number of enforcement actions noted in
Part II.A.3 suggests there is room for a broader impact.
2. Proxy Advisory Firms' Conflicts
Proxy advisory firms' perceived influence has led to close scrutiny of
their operations. In a 2010 concept release, the SEC raised the issue of
whether proxy firms should be subject to regulatory oversight, as they
influenced voting at firms in which they had no economic stake.196 Large
190. Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
1961, 2003-04 (2010) (describing alternatives chosen by plan providers).
191. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1021, 1055-56, n.170 (2007) (quoting John Bogle, founder and
former head of Vanguard, who noted that merely voting against management could "jeopardize the
retention of clients of 401(k) and pension accounts.").
192. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 13, at 886, n.78.
193. For a further explanation of these rules, see supra Part II.A.3.
194. Investment Advisers Act Release, supra note 156, § II.A.2.b.
195. See infra Part II.B.2. A Chinese wall is an information barrier within a firm to prevent an
exchange of information that could raise conflict questions.
196. U.S. Proxy System Concept Release, supra note 18. No action has been taken on this
proposal. The SEC's Division of Investment Management issued a staff legal bulletin in 2014 requiring
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corporate issuers and prominent corporate lawyers have raised similar
concerns. 19 7 Critics have also complained about a lack of transparency in
how proxy advisory firms determine their voting recommendations,
possible conflicts of interest when advisory firm employees serve on
boards of companies that the adviser is rating, and the potential political
biases of those running the advisory firms.198
Actual business conflicts are another issue. In particular, ISS has a
separate consulting business on voting issues that is marketed to issuers.
Issuers that purchase those services may improve their chances of getting a
favorable recommendation from ISS on an important issue. The SEC's
2010 concept release suggested it might further examine proxy firm
disclosures to determine if they "adequately indicate[] to shareholders the
existence of a potential conflict with respect to any particular proposal." 99
ISS has taken steps to wall off that part of the business from advisory
recommendations; a Government Accountability Office study reports that
most ISS clients are satisfied with the steps it has taken in that regard.20 0
For our purposes, it is important that ISS provide voting information
and recommendations that assist shareholders in voting to maximize firm
value. Full disclosure of its voting recommendation methodology and
placement of Chinese walls between its voting advisory services and its
corporate consulting branch are important ways to help ensure this
happens. Of course, we can also rely upon corporate management to
aggressively point out any persistent conflicts of interest.
3. Hedge Fund Conflicts: Empty Voting
Hedge funds, because of their activist nature and sophisticated
financial strategies, may put themselves in conflicted voting positions.
proxy advisers to affirmatively disclose "significant relationships" or "material interests" that may pose
a conflict of interest when they advise clients. Sec.& Exch. Comm'n, Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Staff Legal
Bulletin No. 20 (IM/CF) (June 30, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb20.htm.
197. See BEW & FIELDS, supra note 17, at 6-7 ("In their comments in response to the SEC's
concept release on the proxy industry review, corporate issuers called out specific instances in which
proxy adviser recommendations seemed to dramatically affect voting.").
198. James R. Copeland, Politicized Proxy Advisers vs. Individual Investors: Institutional
ShareholderServices 'Ballot Advice Often Clashes with the Desires of the Average DiversifiedInvestor,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2012, 7:06 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI00008723963904446201
04578012252125632908.html.
199. U.S. Proxy System Concept Release, supra note 18, at 120. That same SEC proposal also
raises the possibility of requiring proxy advisory firms to register as investment advisers. Id § I.
200. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-765, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER
MEETINGS: ISSUES RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON PROXY VOTING

10-11 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-765.
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Funds employ various hedging techniques that can eliminate their financial
stake in a firm while still retaining voting rights, employing what is
commonly referred to as "empty voting." 201 The most notorious example of
this phenomenon occurred during Mylan Laboratories' ("Mylan")
acquisition of King Pharmaceuticals ("King") by a merger form that
required a vote by Mylan shareholders. 202 Richard Perry's hedge fund,
Perry Capital, held shares in King and was anxious to have the deal
consummated. The market viewed the acquisition as bad for Mylan but
good for King, and some Mylan shareholders-led by Carl Icahn with a 9.9
percent stake-threatened to vote against the merger.
In response, Perry Capital accumulated a 9.9 percent stake in Mylan
and simultaneously entered into derivative contracts which hedged its
financial exposure to Mylan stock while retaining the stock's voting rights.
It was then in a position to vote those shares in the Mylan merger
election. 203 The parties' termination of the deal after King announced an
earnings restatement mooted the vote,204 but the point had been madesophisticated financial techniques can be employed to separate voting
rights from financial interest and severely undercut the efficacy of
shareholder voting.
Alternative transactions raise similar conflicts outside of a takeover
context. In CSX Corp. v Children'sInvestment Fund Management (UK),205
a hedge fund, trying to avoid disclosure requirements, entered into total
return equity swaps based on CSX Corp. 206 Its counterparties were banks
performing market-making services to a client for a fee. To cover their
potential exposure if their side of the swap generated liability, the banks
bought an equivalent number of CSX shares. The result was that the banks
201. Bray et al., supra note 12, at 1748. The term "empty voting" was coined in Henry T.C. Hu &
Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL.
L. REv. 811, 815 (2006). We will be using the term in a somewhat more specific to way to refer to the
voting of shares whose economic value has been hedged-what Hu and Black would refer to as
negative economic ownership. Id. at 815.
202. Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Gap Filling,Hedge Funds, and FinancialInnovation, in
NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CHALLENGES 101,
126-27 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007).
203. Hu & Black, supranote 201, at 825.
204. Drug
Firms
Abandon
Transaction,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
28,
2005),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE7D9153DF93BA15751COA9639C8B63.
205. CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
affd, 292 F. App'x 133 (2d Cir. 2008) and af'd in part, vacated in part,remanded, 654 F.3d 276 (2d
Cir. 2011).
206. For a nice explanation of total return equity swaps, see CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 51921.
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were now empty voters in the CSX Corp: they owned the shares but held
none of the financial risk.
Empty voting has been available for some time. By holding shares in a
corporation while simultaneously selling them short, an investor can retain
a vote in the corporation yet still benefit from a decline in the price of the
stock. This possibility has grown with the expansion of sophisticated
securities derivatives markets, and includes the equity swaps mentioned
above. Such transactions have the potential to completely separate voting
rights from the economic interest in the corporation and represent a real
threat to the basis of the shareholder franchise. 207
We should emphasize that this is not a principal-agent problem
between the hedge funds and their investors, as empty voting benefits the
investors in the hedge fund. It can, however, lead to a vote that does not
maximize firm value so as to threaten the foundation of our justification for
a shareholder vote: that the shareholders have a unique interest in
increasing the share price. If a hedge fund actually has an interest in
lowering the share price, then our theory would suggest they should not
have a vote at all.
Our theory suggests that empty voting is not a legitimate exercise of
the franchise and should be banned. As a practical matter, there do not
appear to have been a large number of American cases since the Mylan
episode. Additionally, it may be too costly to enforce such a ban because of
the line drawing problems inherent in defining empty voting, and the
sophistication of the derivatives market will make it difficult to determine
when it occurs. 208 A mix of disclosure and limitation is a second-best
option in such a setting, 209 but we acknowledge empty voting could
undercut the effectiveness of shareholder voting. 210
207. For some examples of empty voting, see Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, 61 BUS. LAW. 1011, 1024-37
(2006); Hu & Black, supra note 201, at 828-36; Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares,
2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 775, 809-11.
208. In a recent court case, Henry Hu and Bernard Black, authors of some of the original papers
on empty voting, saw themselves on opposite sides of the question of whether it had occurred. For a
discussion of this case, see Frank Partnoy, U S. Hedge FundActivism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
SHAREHOLDER POWER 29-32 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas, eds.) (forthcoming 2014) (on file
with author).
209. Id. at 21. See also Hu & Black, supra note 201, at 875-85, 899-901 (discussing a proposal
for integrated ownership disclosure and limits on voter rights); Hu & Black, supra note 207, at 104755, 1057 (same).
210. For a broader point about how limitations in the technology of voting should lead to less use
of voting, see Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, On Improving Shareholder Voting: An Essay for D
DanielPrentice, in RATIONALITY IN COMPANY LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DD PRENTICE 257, 262-
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III. APPLYING OUR VOTING THEORY IN THE WORLD OF
INTERMEDIARY CAPITALISM
Having analyzed the challenges that weak incentives to vote and
conflicts of interest pose to our theory, as well as potential solutions to
them, we now use our theory to analyze two applications of corporate
voting's role today. Part III.A examines high-dollar immediate-value votes,
that is, a shareholder vote that has a clear, immediate impact on the firm's
stock price. Hedge funds often push for these votes when the transactions
can translate directly into investment gains. Here, shareholders can have a
relative advantage as a decisionmaker when boards and management are
conflicted or captured. Two important examples are shareholder votes on
proposed merger transactions, especially in management buyouts, and
contested elections of directors, both control contests and short slate
contests.
Part III.B looks at voting when the outcome will only have a small or
negligible immediate dollar impact on the corporation's stock price, but is
likely to affect the long-term value of the firm. In these instances, hedge
funds are unlikely to lead shareholder opposition because the immediate
payoffs are too low to attract their attention. These shareholder votes may
also serve to monitor conflicts of interest or board capture situations, such
as interested transactions between directors and the corporation, or
decisions relating to executive compensation. In this situation, a
shareholder vote might be appropriate if: (1) managers' actions affect the
current stock price or long-term value of the company; (2) potential or
actual conflicts of interest exist; and (3) there are systemic benefits that will
be realized by all shareholders if the costs of monitoring these conflicts are
less than the benefits. We examine Say on Pay advisory votes on executive
compensation as an example of this situation.
A. HIGH-DOLLAR IMMEDIATE-VALUE MONITORING SITUATIONS
When there is an immediate significant impact on a firm's stock price
from shareholder voting, and management is conflicted or captured,
shareholders have strong incentives to vote. But the proponents of a
shareholder initiative, or the leaders of shareholder opposition to
management proposals, must shoulder the full costs of their actions and
will only capture their pro rata share of any gains that may result. As a
result, many shareholders will be reluctant to initiate activism, although
they are willing to free-ride on the efforts of others. Institutional investors
64, 271 (John Armour & Jennifer Payne eds., 2009).
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are "rationally reticent,"2 11 waiting for someone to lead them in voting
activism.
The new prominence of shareholder voting in this context reflects the
interaction of several actors. First, the organization and regulation of, and
business plans followed by, hedge funds give them high-powered
incentives to seek out governance changes that produce immediate payoffs
for shareholders. Second, groups of hedge funds, known as wolf packs,
magnify this effect, while providing some diversification benefits for
individual funds. Third, other investors, particularly mutual funds, who are
unwilling to initiate voting initiatives, are willing to vote for at least some
of the initiatives put forward by the hedge funds. Fourth, the growing
inflow of institutional fund money into hedge funds magnifies the prior
effect. Finally, hedge funds effectively lobby proxy advisory firms so as to
increase their yield from the institutional investor vote.
1. Hedge Funds Lead Voting Activism in High-Dollar Situations
Hedge fund shareholder activists are good candidates to take the
leadership role. Today, over one hundred hedge funds are engaged in
activism and led over 300 interventions at major American companies in
2013.212 Several characteristics of hedge funds make them well suited to
act as leaders in shareholder voting, and more generally, corporate
governance activism. First, hedge fund managers have more powerful
incentives to seek out return-generating transactions than other institutional
investors. Their income is largely performance based, usually including a
performance fee of 15-20 percent of portfolio profits 213 in addition to a
management fee of 1-2 percent of assets under management. 214 Thus,
successful activism can generate enormous personal benefits to these
managers.
211. Gilson & Gordon, supranote 13, at 917.
212. Martin Lipton, Dealing With Activist Hedge Funds, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 21, 2013),
("The 2013 proxy
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/06/21/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds/
season saw a continuance of the high and increasing level of activist campaigns experienced during the
last ten years. There have been more than 300 activist attacks on major companies during this period.");
Marty Lipton, Karessa L. Cain & Sabastian V. Niles, Lessons from the 2013 Proxy Season, CONF. BD.
GOVERNANCE CENTER BLOG (June 10, 2013), http://tcbblogs.org/govemance/2013/06/10/lessons-fromthe-2013-proxy-season/ (reporting that in 2013, "[s]hareholder activism [was] growing at an increasing
rate").
213. Hounan B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: FinancialInnovation and
Investor Protection,6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 250 (2009).
214. Stephen L. Bonasso, Enemy at the Gates: How Can Investors Stop Hedge-Fund Managers
from Unnecessarily Suspending Redemptions?, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 139, 145
(2012).
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Second, hedge funds are less regulated as to the kinds of investments
they can make, avoiding the regulatory requirements for diversification
imposed on mutual funds, for example. 2 15 On average, activist hedge funds
take a larger ownership stake in a target company than other institutional
investors-initially around 6.3 percent, rising to a maximum of 9.1 percent
of the target's shares. 216 Furthermore, hedge funds trade on margin and
engage in derivatives trading, strategies that can magnify returns on
investment, but that are not available to other institutions, such as mutual
and pension funds.2 17
Finally, hedge fund managers suffer fewer conflicts of interest with
companies in their portfolios than fund managers at other institutional
investors.2 18 For example, in contrast to mutual funds, hedge funds do not
sell products to the target firms whose shares they hold. Unlike government
pension funds, hedge funds are not subject to extensive political control. As
a result, hedge funds are in a good position to monitor corporate boards.
In their monitoring capacity, activist hedge funds push management to
take corporate action to produce high returns. These changes can take the
form of a sale of the company, a financial restructuring, a change to the
company's operating model or governance structure, and other changes. 21 9
In other cases, they oppose management-initiated changes, such as
proposed mergers that could hurt share value.
While the financial crisis and subsequent weak stock market
performance put a temporary damper on activism, the economic recovery
since 2009 "has given companies time to pay down debt and build cash
215. See Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 202, at 112 ("For example, many institutional investors
are subject to the prudent investor standard, a rule that mandates diversification of the institution's
investments so that no one position puts at risk their returns to their beneficiaries."). Hedge funds are
also not subject to heightened fiduciary standards in making their investments, unlike many institutional
investors, such as pension funds and mutual funds. Id at 117-19.
216. Bray et al., supra note 12, at 1747 tbl.1I (Panel A).
217. Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 202, at 119-20.
218. Bray et al., supra note 12, at 1730 ("Hedge fund managers ... suffer fewer conflicts of
interest because they are not beholden to the management of the firms whose shares they hold.").
219. Bray et al., supra note 12, at 1742-43 tbl.l. More recently, Martin Lipton has stated that
there are six "attack devices" employed by hedge funds:
(a) proposing a proxy resolution for creation of a special committee of independent directors
to undertake a strategic review for the purpose of "maximizing shareholder value";
(b) conducting a proxy fight to get board representation .. .; (c) orchestrating a withhold the
vote campaign; (d) convincing institutional investors to support the activist's program;
(e) stock loans, options, derivatives and other devices to increase voting power beyond the
activist's economic equity investment; and (f) using sophisticated public relations campaigns
to advance the activist's arguments.
Lipton, Cain & Niles, supra note 212.
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piles that activists would like to see returned" to shareholders.2 20 This has
led to a resurgence in activism, so that by 2013 over $100 billion was
dedicated to activist strategies. 221
2. The Benefits and Costs of Hedge Fund Activism
The largest corporate governance benefit of hedge fund activism is
reducing the agency costs of corporate management in dispersed publiclyheld corporations. This form of monitoring is reflected in hedge funds
targeting firms that are undervalued by the market, often because of poor
management.2 22 Empirical studies have found the filing of an activist hedge
fund's Schedule 13D creates positive average abnormal returns of 7-8
percent.223 These benefits appear to last: firms targeted by activists see a
1.22 percent increase in operating efficiency one year after acquisition. 224
Activist hedge funds pursue different strategies at targeted firms. 225 Hedge
funds often seek to get a company to use "excess" cash to pay out
dividends or buy back shares. For example, after blocking Deutsche
Barse's acquisition of the London Stock Exchange, a group of hedge fund
activists was able to force Deutsche Barse to commence a share buyback
220. Dan McCrum & David Gelles, Stirrers and Shakers, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2012, 9:16 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/db815c6a-e603-Ilel-a430-00144feab49a.html#axzz2vh8sYBWO.
221. Alexandra Stevenson, No Barbariansat the Gate; Instead,a Forcefor Change, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 6, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/06/no-barbarians-at-the-gate-instead-aforce-for-change/. We note that the universe of hedge funds, of which activists are a small part, is much
larger. One source estimated their total capital in 2006 at $1.2 trillion. David A. Katz & Laura A.
McIntosh, Corporate Governance: Advice on Coping with Hedge Fund Activism, N.Y.L.J., May 25,
2006, at 5, col.
222. See Bray et al., supra note 12, at 1730 ("Hedge fund activists tend to target companies that
are typically 'value' firms, with low market value relative to book value, although they are profitable
with sound operating cash flows and return on assets."). One recent working paper finds that sustained
selling of a company's stock by institutional investors significantly raises the odds that it will be
targeted by activist hedge funds. Nickolay Gantchev & Chotibhak Jotikasthira, Hedge Fund Activists:
2013),
available at
Exit? 21
(Feb.
Institutional
Take Cues from
Do They
(unpublished
http://events.isb.edu/FinanceConference20l3/UpLoad/323fhf/o20draft%202013.2.pdf
manuscript).
223. Bray et al., supra note 12, at 1730. In contrast, Robin Greenwood and Michael Schor find
that while activist hedge funds do produce these abnormal returns, the returns are produced by takeover
premiums, not improvements in management. Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism
and Takeovers, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 362, 363, 374 (2009). The authors find that activist targets which do
not result in a takeover have abnormal returns statistically indistinguishable from zero.
224. Christopher P. Clifford, Value Creation or Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder
Activists, 14 J. CoRP. FIN. 323, 324 (2008). See also Bray et al., supra note 12, at 1772 ("In 2 years, the
leverage ratio (by book values) increases on average by 1.3-1.4 percentage points compared to the level
during the year before the [hedge fund intervention] . . . .").
225. Bray et al., supra note 12, at 1733 (detailing "successful forms of shareholder activism
during the 1980s"). See also McCrum & Gelles, supra note 220 (discussing different strategies
employed by activist investors to financially benefit corporations in which they have holdings).
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and thereby distribute some of its cash holdings. 226 Hedge fund manager
David Einhorn's run at Apple, seeking to force it to pay out some of its
$140 billion in cash to shareholders, is another example. 227 Alternatively,
hedge funds may pressure target firms to spin off less efficient divisions or
assets, or even force the sale of an entire company. 228
A frequent mechanism for a hedge fund to implement any of these
goals is to seek to replace some of the incumbent directors (but less than a
majority) through a short slate proxy contest. 229 For example, TPG-Axon
Capital Management ("TPG-Axon") sought the removal of SandRidge
Energy's CEO and launched a proxy contest to gain seats on the company's
board.230 After a hard-fought battle, the company capitulated and agreed to
give four board seats to TPG-Axon as well as to formally consider firing
the CEO.231
When hedge funds own shares in a company that is the target of an
acquisition, they want to negotiate a higher price for the target company's
shares than the company's management may have negotiated. For example,
Carl Icahn and Southeastern Asset Management sought to block the sale of
Dell, Inc. to its founder Michael Dell and private equity firm Silver Lake
Partners. 232 In another case involving Novartis's acquisition of Chiron,
ValueAct Capital was able to step in and force up the offer premium from
23 to 32 percent. 233 In such a setting, activist hedge funds can also work to
monitor opportunism by other hedge funds in addition to monitoring
corporations. Thus, when the hedge fund controlling Sears attempted to
freeze out the minority shareholders of Sears Canada, a second activist
hedge fund was able to step in and block the underpriced takeover. 234
226. Kahan & Rock, supranote 191, at 1035-36.
227. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Unusual Moves in ConfrontingApple's Huge Pile of Cash, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 12, 2013, 4:55 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/unusual-moves-inconfronting-apples-mountain-of-cash/.
228. Bray et al., supra note 12, at 1741.
229. See Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential
Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 610, 612-13 (2013) (highlighting two instances in which activist
shareholders notified current boards of companies that they would be nominating their own slate of
directors to pursue an agenda).
230. Michael J. de la Merced, SandRidge Settles Fight with Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13,
2013, 5:11 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/sandridge-settles-fight-with-activist-investor/.
231. Id.
232. Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Battle Over Dell'sFate, Don't Underestimate CarlIcahn, N.Y.
TIMES (July 11, 2013, 3:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/ll/in-battle-over-dells-fatedont-underestimate-carl-icahn/.
233. Kahan & Rock, supranote 191, at 1037.
234. Id. at 1038.
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However, hedge funds have detractors. Some corporate lawyers have
claimed that hedge funds are "villains," 235 pointing to activist hedge funds'
focus on booking short-term profits at the expense of the long-term value
of their portfolio companies. 23 6 Whether hedge funds harmfully focus on
short-term gains is difficult to determine conclusively. 237 Some evidence
would seem to suggest that hedge fund short-termism is not a huge
problem. 238 First, hedge funds seem to have little trouble recruiting longterm investors to support their activist goals. 239 If a hedge fund's plans
actually only produced a short-term gain at the expense of long-term
profitability, long-term investors would be reluctant to support them.2 40
Second, as already mentioned, empirical evidence suggests that hedge fund
activism improves a firm's long-term prospects. 241 Third, activist hedge
fund holding periods are not that short, with one study finding an average
holding period of thirty-one months.24 2 Finally, one study of hedge fund
interventions from 1994 to 2007 found that the stock price gains resulting
from the initial announcement of a hedge fund's activism were sustained
over a five-year period, as were improvements in other measures of
returns. 243 All of this evidence supports the claim that hedge fund activism
235. Katz & McIntosh, supra note 221 (arguing that activist hedge funds are the villains of the
2000s).
236. Lipton, Deconstructing American Business H1,supra note 15, at 1 (arguing that the most
important problem for American business in the future is "[p]ressure on boards from activist investors
to manage for short-term share price performance rather than long-term value creation."); Roe, supra
note 15, at 982 (reporting that managerial and boardroom autonomy has been justified recently by
claims that activist hedge fund shareholders are focused on short-term gains). But see Bebchuk, supra
note 15, at 1638 (arguing against claims that activist investors take profitable short-term actions that are
in the long term value-decreasing); Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Label for Activist Investors that No
Longer Fits, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2013, 3:42 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/a-label-foractivist-investors-that-no-longer-fits/ (rejecting the claim that hedge funds are short-term shareholders).
237. Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governanceand the New Hedge FundActivism: An Empirical
Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 702 (2007) ("The allegedly value-destroying short term approach of many
hedge fund[] activists is harder to analyze, but again seems to cause little concern for other investors.").
238. See generally Roe, supra note 15, for an extensive discussion of the evidence regarding
positive and negative claims that investors have a short-term perspective harmful to corporations, in
which the author ultimately rejects these arguments.
239. Kahan & Rock, supra note 191, at 1089 ("To the extent that the largest shareholders are
effectively indexers, a strategy that results in a short-term increase in share price (which benefits hedge
funds), but a long-term loss (that hurts long-term shareholders), will not be attractive."). See also
Briggs, supra note 237, at 701-03.
240. Kahan & Rock, supra note 191, at 1088-89.
241. Brav et al., supranote 12, at 1731.
242. William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets: Long-Term Results 10 (Univ.
Pa. Law Sch. Research Paper No. 10-17, Sept. 2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1677517. See also Bray et al., supra note 12, at 1731-32 ("Hedge funds
are not short-term in focus, as some critics have claimed.").
243. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Bray & Wei Jiang, The Long Term Effects of Hedge Fund
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is not generally a short-term strategy and generates valuable monitoring of
corporate management. 2 "
Is the value created cost-justified? As we noted above, investors pay
hedge fund managers very well. 24 5 Investors' interests in the hedge fund are
also illiquid. Lockup provisions at hedge funds generally prohibit
investments from being withdrawn for a specific period of time after being
invested in the fund, often six to twenty-four months. 24 6 In addition to the
lockup period, funds also require a thirty- to ninety-day notice period
before withdrawing funds. 247 Activist funds normally have longer lockup
and notice periods. 248 Hedge fund managers may also impose additional
"gates" or "side pockets" to limit investor withdrawals in crisis
situations. 24 9 Investors would need to get very high returns to convince
them to invest in these limited-liquidity, high-cost investments. 250 Even so,
hedge funds' high costs reduce their net monitoring benefits.
Activism, 114 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2014) (manuscript at 13). See also Nicole M. Boyson
& Robert M. Mooradian, Experienced Hedge Fund Activists (Apr. 3, 2012) (unpublished manuscript at
2-3) (on file with authors) (finding that hedge fund activism "can lead to superior long-term target firm
and hedge fund performance").
244. Davidoff Solomon, supra note 236. See also, Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of
Hedge FundActivism: Some EmpiricalEvidence, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 459, 477-83 (2013) (claiming
to debunk the myth that hedge funds are short-term in their focus).
245. Some investors prefer to hold a portfolio of hedge funds rather than investing in a single
hedge fund. They can do so by buying shares in a "Fund of Hedge Funds", an investment vehicle whose
portfolio consists of equity interests in a number of hedge funds. Hedge FundStrategy-Fundof Hedge
Funds,

BARCLAYHEDGE:

ALTERNATIVE

INVESTMENT

DATABASES,

available

at

http://www.barclayhedge.com/research/educational-articles/hedge-fund-strategy-definition/hedge-fundstrategy-fund-of-funds.html. These Fund of Hedge Fund investments typically have higher fees than
single hedge funds because they include an additional management fee charged by the firm organizing
them. Id They do have the advantages of providing a new investor with the services of an experienced
fund manager, giving investors some degree of diversification in their investment, and having lower
minimum investment requirements. Id.
246. Shadab, supra note 213, at 252; Bonasso, supra note 214, at 149. In some funds, investors
are able to choose longer lockup periods for lower fees. Bonasso, supranote 214, at 149.
247. Id. at 150.
248. Clifford, supra note 224, at 333.
249. Adam L. Aiken, Christopher P. Clifford & Jesse A. Ellis, Hedge Funds and Discretionary
Liquidity Restrictions, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2-4) (finding that hedge funds
enacted discretionary liquidity restrictions following poor performance and when their assets were more
illiquid). A "side pocket" is a separate account created by a hedge fund for segregating illiquid or hardto-value securities. Id at 6. A "gate" temporarily, partially, or fully restricts the ability of investors to
redeem their interest in the fund. Id. at 5.
250. Recent returns to activism have been high. Dan McCrum & David Gelles, Activist Investors
Celebrate a Banner Year, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2012, 6:24 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
6448e810-3a5f-11e2-a32f-00144feabdcO.html#axzz3BU00xpIL (stating that "cash has flooded into the
sector" because of the high returns to activist funds). See also Boyson & Mooradian, supra note 243, at
2-4 (finding that experienced activist funds outperformed less experienced funds and that their targets
earned higher long-term stock returns than the targets of the less experienced funds).
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3. Hedge Activists Gain Support from Wolf Packs
Hedge funds need other shareholders to support their efforts if they are
going to be successful in bringing about changes at portfolio firms. One
place they may look is other activist hedge funds that take positions in the
same companies, sometimes called the "wolf pack." 2 51 While explicit
coordination between hedge funds is limited because funds normally want
to avoid forming a Schedule 13D group and making the subsequent
disclosure, 252 market forces encourage pack behavior. When one activist
fund announces a large stake in a target company, other funds may follow
hoping to free ride on the benefits-and these free riders usually support
the activist fund.253 By joining together, this collection of hedge funds can
exert significantly more influence than any individual fund could.2 54 This
pack behavior allows hedge funds to establish sufficiently large dollar
amounts of holdings to take on even large companies without
compromising the diversity of their activism. 255
Wolf pack behavior appears to be a significant phenomenon. For
example, in the proposed 2006 Lexar Media-Micron Technology deal, a
wolf pack joined with hedge fund investor Icahn Associates Corp. to
oppose the merger, assembling 46 percent of the outstanding shares.2 56 In
2004, the hedge fund Children's Investment Fund announced its opposition
to Deutsche Brse's attempt to acquire the London Stock Exchange,
leading within weeks to a wolf pack's formation with 35 percent of the
outstanding stock.2 57
While wolf packs can force targeted firms to capitulate to the hedge
funds' demands, the result will not always be value-enhancing. When Steel
Partners, one of the most prominent activist funds, announced its campaign
to elect a minority of BKF Capital Group's board, "a concerted 'wolf pack'
campaign" of activists formed, allowing Steel Partners to subsequently
251. Andrew R. Brownstein & Trevor S. Norwitz, ShareholderActivism in the M&A Context,
WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ (May 15, 2006), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/
resources/documents/wirkmemo51506.pdf ("Many hedge funds move in loosely aligned packs, testing
the limits of securities reporting and antitrust rules by taking advantage of the ambiguity in concepts
like 'groups' ....
).
252. Briggs, supranote 237, at 697-98,698 n.109.
253. Bratton, supranote 149, at 1379.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Jeff Chappell, Hedge Fund Investors Question Lexar-Micron Deal, EDN NETWORK (Apr. 7,
2006), http://www.edn.com/electronics-news/4319016/Hedge-Fund-Investors-Question-Lexar-MicronDeal.
257. Kahan & Rock, supra note 191, at 1035-36. The wolf pack's stake subsequently grew to
between 40-60 percent of shares. Id. at 1036.
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succeed in its efforts to elect some directors. 25 8 Nevertheless, the firm's
employees responded by leaving the company and taking their clients with
them, leaving Steel Partners and its wolf pack to take heavy losses on their
investments. 259
From the perspective of our theory, the importance of wolf packs is
that they represent large blocks of voting support for the lead hedge fund,
with most (if not all) of the pack members having similar voting
preferences to the lead fund. In situations where the issue being voted on is
one in which all shareholders hold similar interests, such as the desire to
get the best price in a sale of the company, having a large wolf pack block
will further the interests of all shareholders. However, if the issue is one in
which shareholders may disagree, perhaps because of different internal
rates of return or views of the appropriate time horizon, then the presence
of the wolf pack may result in pushing the outcome of the vote in the
direction that the hedge funds prefer, potentially disappointing other
investors who have different internal rates of return or time preferences.
The wolf pack scenario shows that there may be some tension between
the two positive functions of a shareholder vote. On one side, if we believe
that wolf packs provide some private information about the wisdom of a
certain corporate decision, the shareholder vote will act to aggregate the
private information so that the corporation will make the best decision. On
the other hand, if there is a conflict in the preferences among shareholders,
then the wolf pack will act to dilute the influence of the other shareholders,
and the preference aggregation function of the vote will be less effective.
Which of these effects dominates will depend on how influential hedge
funds' views are to institutional investors.
4. Institutional Investors Follow Hedge Funds' Lead
Even with the support of wolf packs, activist hedge funds need
institutional investors to vote with them in order to succeed. 260 Hedge funds
can improve institutional investor monitoring by identifying
258. Timothy A. Kruse & Kazunori Suzuki, Steel Partners'Activism Efforts at United Industrial,
Ronson, and BKF Capital: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, 38 MANAGERIAL FIN. 587, 589 (2012)
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1485696.
259. Id
260. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 13, at 897 ("By giving institutions [the ability to vote by
creating a proxy fight], the activists increase the value of governance rights; the institutions' exercise of
governance rights then becomes the mechanism for creating value for beneficial owners."). See also
J.W. Verret, Economics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Pensions, Trusts, and Hedge Funds in an Era of
Financial Re-Intermediation, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 63, 69-70 (2007) (discussing how
institutional investors may invest in activist hedge funds and facilitate activism).
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underperforming companies, making the necessary undiversified
investment in those companies, and taking the leadership role in
challenging incumbent management. Hedge fund activism has the ability to
mitigate institutional investors' passivity. For example, hedge funds'
concentrated holdings allow them to invest the necessary resources even
when institutions' holdings are too small to justify activism.
Hedge funds seek support from institutional investors to achieve their
goals.26 1 In some cases, this means a two-step approach: hedge funds first
talk with institutional investors about the target company, then contact that
company once they know they have the support of institutions and their
large shareholdings. 262 Alternatively, some institutional investors "maintain
open and regular lines of communication with activists, including sharing
potential 'hit lists' of possible targets." 263 Overall though, the hedge funds
frequently get institutional support. As one institutional investor manager
put it, "[t]he hedge funds have done a marvelous job. No matter how we
feel about companies, traditional managers simply cannot move as fast to
achieve our aims. We were right behind (the hedge funds), but we couldn't
have done it without them." 264
Mutual funds frequently work with hedge funds in shareholder
activism. While mutual funds face disincentives to shoulder the cost of
monitoring, they are well-situated to support hedge fund activism. 265 For
example, in the Deutsche Borse-London Stock Exchange proposed merger,
mutual funds joined with the activist hedge fund to confront the Deutsche
B~rse board.26 6 In another situation, the Legg Mason mutual fund worked
with ValueAct Capital hedge fund to raise the acquiring price for
Novartis's acquisition of Chiron in 2005.267
Public pension funds and company pension funds are more hesitant to
openly follow activist investors than mutual funds. 268 Public pension fund
261. Lipton, supra note 212, at I (noting that hedge funds seek to "convinc[e] institutional
investors to support the activist's program"). Lipton argues that potential target companies should
"[m]aintain regular, close contact with major institutional investors [as] CEO and CFO participation is
very important." Id.
262. McCrum & Gelles, supra note 220 ("The activists are having discussions with major
shareholders beforehand... . They can go in and say, 'Most of your shareholders feel this way."').
263. Lipton, Cain & Niles, supra note 212 (claiming that even when institutions don't have
limited partnership interests in these funds, they are actively supporting them).
264. Louise Armistead, Saved by the Growing Power of Hedge Funds, SUNDAY TIMES, (Mar. 13,
2005), http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/business/articlel03547.ece.
265. Kahan & Rock, supranote 191, at 1048.
266. Id. at 1035.
267. Id. at 1037.
268. Id at 1061-62.
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trustees are normally elected or appointed officials who lack both the
compensation incentives and often the credibility and knowledge to pursue
aggressive investment strategies. 269 In addition, public pension funds
operate in a political environment where aggressive activism might be seen
as inappropriate, 270 while the company pension fund manager prefers to be
one step removed and not as directly associated with the activism. 27 1 But,
overall, hedge funds actively and often successfully court the voting
support of institutional investors.
5. Institutional Investors Invest Heavily in Hedge Funds
Institutional investors support hedge funds in a more direct way as
well-they are their main source of investment capital.2 7 2 Citi Prime
Finance, a division of Citibank, estimates that institutional investors
accounted for 66 percent of all hedge fund capital, with over $1.47 trillion
dollars in hedge fund investments in 201 1.273 It projects these investment
levels to rise rapidly over the next several years to reach $2.47 trillion by
2016.274 Hedge funds would be hard pressed to engage in many of their
activities without this capital.
More importantly for our purposes, this suggests that institutional
investors have a second interest in supporting hedge fund activism beyond
the returns that they generate in any particular company by voting in favor
of activists' agendas-a direct return on their investments in the hedge
funds themselves. In other words, institutional fund investors have multiple
interests in hedge fund activism generating increases in target company
value.
When a private pension fund invests in an activist hedge fund, it is
supporting the hedge fund's activism. 275 This investment solves two
problems that company pension funds would face if they were activists
269. Id. at 1059-61.
270. See id at 1059-60 (discussing pension fund controllers who have come under scrutiny for
potentially politically-motivated governance choices).
271. Verret, supra note 260, at 70 ("With corporate governance activity one step removed,
corporate pension managers can wash their hands of the dirty work.").
272. See Lipton, Cain & Niles, supra note 212 (.'Activist Hedge Fund' has become an asset class
in which institutional investors are making substantial investments.").
273. Cm PRIME FINANCE REPORT, supra note 132, at 33 tbl.21, 34.
274. Id.
275. However, some commentators question whether these funds are a major source of hedge fund
capital. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 191, at 1068 ("While we lack precise data, we do not believe
that corporate pension funds are a major source of capital for hedge funds at this time. And, given the
declining importance of corporate defined benefit plans, we are skeptical that they ever will become
one.").
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themselves. First, being an investor rather than a direct participant allows
the pension fund manager to be far removed from any potential fallout
related to the activism.2 76 Additionally, a pension fund manager can take
small stakes in multiple activist hedge funds, which will in turn acquire the
large stakes in a target necessary for efficient activism. This permits the
private pension fund to make what are essentially undiversified, potentially
more valuable, investments than it would otherwise be allowed to make. 277
Other types of institutional investors also put large sums of money
into hedge funds. 278 These include university endowments, sovereign
wealth funds, insurance companies, and foundations.2 79 Sovereign wealth
funds' investment in hedge funds is increasing at a particularly rapid rate.
In each case, these investment vehicles will have strong incentives to
support hedge funds generally, and more particularly when they engage in
hedge fund activism.
Institutions that hold both an interest in an activist hedge fund
targeting a firm as well as stock in the target firm may pose a problem for
our theory of shareholder voting. Suppose the hedge fund proposes that the
target firm take actions that maximize the value of the hedge fund's interest
in the firm, but which are value-decreasing for the firm overall.280 If the
institution decides to vote its stock to support the hedge fund's activism,
and thereby maximize the value of its investment in the fund, it will be
voting not to maximize the value of the target firm. 28' As discussed in
Part III.A.2, there is substantial evidence that hedge funds are not shortterm investors, but if this were to occur, it would violate our claim that
shareholders vote to maximize firm value.
To summarize, institutions that own interests in activist hedge funds
will have two different interests in their activism: (1) their direct interest in
maximizing the value of their portfolio companies, and (2) their indirect
interest in maximizing the value of their investment in the hedge fund. The
claim that institutional investors often follow hedge funds in their voting
activism, 282 while accurate as far as it goes, misses this second very
276. Verret, supra note 260, at 70.
277. Id.
278. Crfl PRIME FINANCE REPORT, supra note 132, at 10, 29-30.
279. Id.
280. This could happen if there is a divergence in the long-term and short-term value of the firm
because of hedge fund proposals.
281. See Gregor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Cross-Ownership, Returns, and Voting in
Mergers, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 391, 397 (2008) (finding that mutual funds that hold shares in both a target
and acquirer which have entered into a proposed merger are more likely to vote for the merger).
282. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 13, at 867.
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important motivation behind institutional investors' support for hedge fund
activism.
6. Proxy Advisory Services' Role in Hedge Fund Activism
One final set of important players in hedge funds' voting activism is
the proxy advisory firms. If ISS recommends that its institutional clients
vote in favor of the hedge fund's candidates in a contested election, the
hedge fund is much more likely to win.283 Effectively, the hedge fund
supplements its direct connections with institutional investors by
leveraging ISS's voting advice and information processing to reach out to
institutional shareholders. It is extremely effective: one study examined
thirteen incidents where ISS backed hedge funds in proxy fights for board
seats and found that in twelve of them the hedge fund won. 284 In other
words, when ISS backs hedge funds, "they win." 285
Not surprisingly, hedge funds try hard to persuade ISS of the merits of
their plans for the targeted firms. 286 Hedge funds often prepare
presentations and legal briefs about their plans and even hire investment
bankers to prepare white papers to promote the activism. 287 Of course,
companies are also aware of the importance of the ISS voting
recommendation and prepare their own counterarguments and
presentations. 288
Some see proxy advisory firms as favoring activists over managers. 289
For example, in 2003 Barington Capital Group proposed the election of
two new directors to the board of Nautica Enterprises. 290 Barington was
able to convince ISS to give positive recommendations for its nominees,
283. Cindy R. Alexander et al., The Role of Advisory Services in Proxy Voting 34-35 (Nat'1
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15143, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=1434658 (finding that proxy advisory firms' recommendations are a good
predictor of proxy contest outcomes, with positive recommendations in favor of one party leading to
increased voting support).
284. Briggs, supranote 237, at 698.
285. Id.
286. See id at 699 ("The object nevertheless remains to persuade, and it appears that hedge fund
activists are taking advantage of their opportunities in new ways. ISS has come to be treated almost as a
sort of latter-day cross between Solomon and the Pied Piper of Hamelin before which contestants make
road-show financial presentations and, in at least one instance, purely legal arguments.").
287. Id.
288. See Lipton, Cain & Niles, supranote 212 (arguing that a target firm must make a
"sophisticated presentation of the company's finances and business to have any prospect that [proxy
advisory firms] will reject the activist's argument and support the company's").
289. Id. (stating that "ISS and Glass Lewis ... favor activists over management").
290. Kahan & Rock, supra note 191, at 1030.
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and one month later both nominees were elected. 29' Additionally, ISS may
provide a convenient third-party opinion on the value of a hedge fund's
strategies. For example, in the conflicted MONY deal where two hedge
funds put forth competing plans, 292 ISS backed the fund it believed best
represented shareholders, Highfields, and ultimately Highfields's proposal
was successful.29 3 In short, proxy advisory firms play an important role in
securing institutional voting support for hedge fund activism.
7. Hedge Funds and Our Theory of Corporate Voting
Tying the discussion in Part III.A back into our theory, hedge funds
are shareholders whose return is contingent on the stock price and who
have strong incentives to raise that stock price for all shareholders. Because
of their independence and sharp focus on the stock price, hedge funds are
well-positioned to monitor board conflict situations using the shareholder
vote. Hedge funds also stimulate other shareholders to overcome their
rational reticence to engage in activist, informed voting behavior.
In addition, with their financial expertise and willingness to pay for
investment bankers' services, hedge funds are able to bring private
information to a corporate decision, such as the appropriate price to be paid
in a merger. This permits shareholder voting to play the positive role of
aggregating private information to help reach a superior corporate decision.
Finally, hedge fund driven voting may further serve a preference
aggregation function. Hedge funds may have higher internal rates of return
and view a short-term return (if we accept corporate management's
perspective) more positively than long-time horizon shareholders. By
aggregating the votes of hedge funds and institutional investors, we ensure
that the outcome of the vote is likely to reflect the underlying preferences
of all of the company's significant shareholders. Proxy advisory firms
further facilitate this process by assisting institutional investors to solve the
collective action problem and fully express their preferences in a vote.
Going back to the example discussed in Part I.C.2.b, the fight between
Biglari Holdings and Cracker Barrel over a shareholder resolution that the
corporation should take on significant debt in order to make an immediate
twenty-dollar per share dividend, Biglari's preferences were for a shortterm payout, whereas management preferred to continue to use the cash in
its existing business strategy. While management could have ignored any
291.
292.
293.

Id.
Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1073-74. See also Gantchev, supranote 229, at 612-13.
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vote on Biglari's initial shareholder proposal, it instead chose to put the
proposal on the ballot itself to see what Cracker Barrel's shareholders
thought about the matter.294 This permitted the board to find out what
shareholders' aggregate preferences were-and to learn that its investors
supported management's position. This is a good illustration of how a
shareholder vote can provide valuable information to a board.
To summarize, hedge funds have been at the core of high-dollar
immediate-value shareholder activism. While they play the leading role in
this activism though, other players are important, including institutional
investors and proxy advisory firms.
B. LOW-DOLLAR IMMEDIATE-VALUE VOTING SITUATIONS
Low-value shareholder voting situations arise when shareholders are
asked to vote on issues that have little if any immediate discernible effect
on the company's stock price. Given that voting is costly, one might
conclude that these are not suitable occasions for exercising the franchise.
However, our theory of shareholder voting can be extended to situations in
which the value of intervention has a long-term impact on firm value that
does not show up immediately in stock price.
As a theoretical basis for this distinction between short- and long-run
value, we provisionally accept corporate management's stated view that
these can be different things.295 For instance, boards frequently claim such
a difference exists when they use defensive tactics to block a tender offer,
arguing that they have a better strategy for managing the corporation to
maximize its long-term value. 296 Commentators, regulators, and investors
have accepted this idea that long-term value is the right metric for
managing the corporation. 297
294. Cracker Barrel and Biglari Proxy Contest Chronology, supra note 95.
295. See Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989) ("Directors
are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term profit unless there is
clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy."); Lipton, Deconstructing American Business II, supra
note 15, at 1 (stating that the most important problem for American business in the future is "[p]ressure
on boards from activist investors to manage for short-term share price performance rather than longterm value creation."); Roe, supra note 15, at 979-80 ("It would not be unfair ... to pose the policy
issue as: Whether the long-term interests of the nation's corporate system and economy should be
jeopardized in order to benefit speculators interested . .. only in a quick profit. .. ?" (quoting Martin
Lipton, Takeover bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW 101, 104 (1979)).
296. See, for instance, the argument of Time, Inc.'s management's in Paramount, 571 A.2d at
1149-50 ("The Time board maintained that the Warner transaction offered a greater long-term value for
the stockholders and, unlike Paramount's offer, did not pose a threat to Time's survival and its
'culture."').
297. Bebchuk, supra note 15, at 1639-40.
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Assuming arguendo that this is a potential metric for evaluating
corporate activities, then corporate voting can be justified whenever
(1) managers' actions affect the long-term value of the company; and
(2) there are systemic benefits that will be realized by all shareholders if
they could monitor managers' divergence from this value, and the cost of
the monitoring would not consume the benefit. A shareholder vote to
remove takeover defenses, such as classified boards, might be one
example. 298 The costs of such a vote are small and the value of removing
the classified board is only likely to show up if the company becomes a
takeover target.299
Shareholders should use the vote to play this monitoring role for
actions that pose director conflicts of interest, such as interested
transactions, or those involving potentially captured boards setting officer
compensation. For example, when the board is considering managerial
compensation, concerns about structural bias and independent directors'
willingness to bargain hard over pay levels may make shareholders useful
additional monitors of CEO pay, 300 even if resulting changes to pay levels
do not affect stock price.
Some initially low-value shareholder votes could also trigger
subsequent high-value activism that affects stock price. For instance, a
failed Say on Pay vote, in which the company receives a low level of
shareholder support for its executives' compensation, could act as a signal
of shareholder discontent that attracts the interest of an activist hedge fund.
The recent case of Hess Corp. ("Hess") and Elliot Management Corp.
("Elliot Management") may be just such a situation. In 2012, Hess
shareholders cast only 58 percent of their votes in favor of management's
Say on Pay proposal,30 ' indicating to the market that the company's
shareholders were unhappy. In 2013, activist hedge fund Elliot
Management launched a proxy contest for control of Hess. This hotly
contested fight led to Elliot Management getting several seats on the Hess
298. Thomas & Cotter, supra note 85, at 398 (finding that boards are more willing to remove
classified boards after precatory shareholder proposals asking them to do so receive strong shareholder
support).
Cufiat et al., The Vote is Cast, supra note 14, at 1945-46 (finding that in close votes, the
299.
passage of shareholder proposals to declassify the board increases firm value).
300.

See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED

PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 100 (2004) (describing a circumstance in which it would be
helpful to have shareholders act as additional monitors of CEO pay).
301. Daniel Gilbert & Joann S. Lublin, Board Pay Adds Fuel to Hess Battle, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
25, 2013, 8:03 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl000142412788732346620457838267229
6842906.
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board.30 2 More generally, any time a company fails its Say on Pay vote, this
is likely to signal to activist hedge funds that it is suffering from poor
performance, excess compensation levels, and a high degree of shareholder
discontent.
We recognize that voting on low dollar value proposals is more
difficult to justify than voting that results in high immediate shareholder
value. Long-term value is a slippery concept that (some have argued)
managers have used to justify entrenching themselves in power,303 and
which could potentially serve as a justification for any action directors wish
to take. As a result, we believe that its use as a criterion for allowing
shareholder voting must be considered on a case-by-case basis and be
critically evaluated. For example, we find it difficult to justify shareholder
voting on Rule 14a-8 corporate social responsibility proposals. While
proponents of such measures may claim that they relate to the firm's longterm value, we find these arguments to be quite attenuated and lacking
support in empirical research.304
In the remainder of this section we provide a more detailed
examination of voting in low immediate-value contexts and how that
voting too is consistent with our approach to shareholder voting.
1. Shareholders Have Insufficient Incentives to Lead on These Issues
In low-dollar immediate-value situations, the costs to an investor to
initiate activism may exceed the immediate payoffs, so that few investors
are likely to step up to the plate. For starters, activist hedge funds are
focused on actions that will immediately increase shareholder value. Lowdollar immediate-value situations are not interesting to hedge funds
because: (1) they usually need to return capital to investors within a sixmonth window, and (2) their form of intervention may have high
transaction costs (requiring liquidity to buy and hold a long-term stake). As
with high-value situations though, the agency costs of intermediary
capitalism make it unlikely that institutional investors will initiate action.305
302. Michael J. de la Merced, How Elliot and Hess Settled a Bitter Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES
(May 16, 2013, 9:13 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/hess-and-elliott-settle-fight-overcompanys-board/.
303. Bebchuk, supranote 15, at 1642-43.
304. Thomas & Cotter, supra note 85, at 370 ("Academic research has generally concluded that
corporate governance proposals raise important substantive issues, while the social responsibility
proposals are frequently viewed as frivolous."). In the context of Rule 14a-8, we would draw the line at
shareholder voting that relates to firms' corporate governance structures and put the burden on
proponents of moving outside of those boundaries to justify their positions.
305. See supra Part II.A.2.
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Taking a leadership position means incurring the costs of activism, and in
low-dollar immediate-value situations, the chance of recouping these costs
quickly through activism is very small. On top of that, an individual
institution that initiates activism will still face the same free rider problems
that it faced in high-dollar immediate-value situations. 306
2. Mandatory Voting and Proxy Advisory Firms Help Shareholders to Act
Collectively
Even if one investor initiates activism, other institutional investors
will not want to incur the necessary costs to cast informed votes if they do
not see an immediate payoff sufficient to cover these costs. 307 Here, the
governmental mandate for fiduciary voting plays a larger role than in the
high-impact context previously discussed. For institutional shareholders
following business plans that make them rationally reticent to vote,
mandatory voting facilitates a solution to the shareholders' collective action
problem, especially when the immediate payoffs to voting are small.308 A
second justification could be that when short-term value effects are low,
but long-term value is adversely impacted, there might be a lack of
shareholder monitoring, so the government mandates informed institutional
corporate voting.
306. One exception might be the Shareholder Rights Project that was started by Professor Lucian
Bebchuk. It seems to be a type of third-party corporate governance activist, acting on behalf of a
number of institutional investors that ultimately are the sponsors for these board declassification
proposals. THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT 2012 REPORT, SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT 1-3

(2012), available at http://srp.law.harvard.edu/releases/SRP-2012-Annual-Report.pdf. Based on the
statistics reported in its documents, it appears to have been very successful in getting companies to
declassify their boards. Id. at 9. But it is an open question whether such an organization would be
possible without the uncompensated efforts of a number of Harvard Law School students and faculty.
307. See Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will it Happen? Will it Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J.
1009, 1019-20 (1994) ("When investors decide whether to commit resources, they are more concerned
with whether an institution performed better than others than with the return realized by the institution.
If relationship investing does not create a competitive advantage, an institution has little incentive to
engage in it, even if it creates net present value."); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain)
Significance of InstitutionalShareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 452-53 (1991) ("What interferes
with the realization of the optimists' hope-the hope that institutional investors will be as active,
informed, and skeptical as individuals holding an equivalent stake-are the agency costs. Money
managers, like outside directors, but unlike the large individual shareholders who institutional
shareholders are thought to resemble, have precious few economic or legal incentives to discipline
corporate management actively, while facing substantial disincentives.").
308. In a related vein, if the government is concerned about potential conflicts of interest in
institutional voting, it can require disclosure of how the institution votes its shares so that its
beneficiaries can assess whether the fund voted to maximize the value of its investment. This may be
the justification for the requirement that mutual funds disclose their voting records on corporate matters,
thereby potentially exposing any pro-management biases arising out of the funds' efforts to sell their
retirement plan services. See supra Part II.B. .
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To satisfy the government mandate, institutional investors need to be
informed and to decide how to vote their shares. Proxy advisory firms
provide an efficient source of information, and voting recommendations
play a different role in low-impact contexts. In both high- and low-dollar
immediate-value situations, proxy advisory firms help to solve the
monitoring problem by offering a low-cost way for institutional investors
to inform themselves about issues on the corporate ballot and in some cases
to cast votes for the institutions. As previously discussed, in the high-value
case, activist hedge funds are already providing potential leadership on
corporate governance issues by bringing them to shareholders' attention.
Rationally reticent institutions will be able to follow the hedge funds' lead
in casting their ballots, although proxy advisory firms often function as
independent verifiers of the truth of the hedge funds' claims and the target
company management's counterclaims.
In low-dollar immediate-value cases, institutions generally vote only
because they are required by law to do so, and they want to spend the least
amount of money possible to cast their ballots in an informed, valuemaximizing way so as to comply with their legally mandated duties. Proxy
advisory firms play a valuable role by reducing voting costs significantly.
Exploiting economies of scale, these firms provide necessary information
to a wide set of clients at a lower price than they could obtain for
themselves; using this information, they may be better able than their
clients to determine how to vote the stock in order to increase firm value. 309
In other words, proxy advisory firms' recommendations may provide
needed guidance to institutions on how to cast their votes so as to maximize
firm value.
Even in situations where the shareholder vote relates to actions that
create no value, or even negative value, for shareholders, proxy advisory
firms may minimize institutions' voting costs. In these situations, the
institution will have even less incentive to invest its own time and
resources in deciding how to vote, making it desirable to completely
outsource the information gathering and decisionmaking to a (cheaper)
third party. This might be the case for Rule 14a-8 social responsibility
proposals.
In cases where the stakes for the shareholders are lower, it is important
309. Cotter, Palmiter & Thomas, supra note 177, at 6-8, This last point assumes that proxy
advisory firms have better information at a lower cost on how to maximize share price than do their
clients. It might also be the case that the proxy advisory firms simply know their clients' preferences so
well that their voting recommendations reflect them accurately.
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that the signals coming out of the proxy advisory firms be unbiased. If they
are not, and the voting adviser recommends value-decreasing action, then
their institutional clients are unlikely to conduct sufficient research to
detect the difference. While corporate management will frequently point
out any imperfections in proxy advisory firms' recommendations, possible
regulatory responses remain in play.
3. The Example of Say on Pay
One example of low-dollar immediate-value votes are the Say on Pay
advisory votes on executive compensation that are required by DoddFrank. 310 As discussed below, Say on Pay votes may increase both
immediate value as well as long-term value for shareholders, net of the
costs of voting. Shareholders use Say on Pay votes to target companies that
exhibit both poor performance and high levels of executive pay. 3 11
However, even considerable overpayments to corporate managers may not
affect stock prices when the companies in question have market
capitalizations in the billions. In other words, for a $100 billion company,
the loss of several million dollars in compensation overpayments does not
immediately affect stock price. 3 12
The Say on Pay vote might also be viewed as a vote on the long-term
value of the firm because compensation practices reflect the quality of
corporate governance: firms with weak governance structures often suffer
from poor performance and high levels of managerial compensation. 313 Say
on Pay may affect governance and compensation at firms for a variety of
reasons, which we identify here and discuss in the remainder of this
section. First, if a CEO is powerful enough to extract rents from his or her
firm, then Say on Pay may provide the board of directors with additional
leverage to negotiate a better deal for the firm.314 Second, if directors are
310.

James F. Cotter, Alan R. Palmiter & Randall S. Thomas, The First Year Of Say-on-Pay

Under Dodd-Frank: An Empirical Analysis and Look Forward,81 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 967, 977-79

(2013).
311. See infra text accompanying note 321.
312. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Vote Goes Against Outsize Executive Pay, but It's Hardlya
Blow, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2013, 8:33 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/a-vote-goesagainst-outsize-executive-pay-but-its-hardly-a-blow/ (noting that Oracle's general counsel argued that a
$50 million overpayment to its CEO would constitute only 0.36 percent of its free cash flow).
313. It might also constitute "a referendum or vote of confidence in the CEO--empowering
shareholders by providing a mechanism through which they can punish a CEO for poor performance."
Cuflat et al., Say Pays!, supranote 14, at 9.
314. Protecting Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by Improving Corporate
Governance: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S Comm. on Banking, Hous. &
Urban Affairs, 11Ith Cong. 47-49 (2009) (prepared statement of John C. Coates IV, John F. Cogan Jr.,
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worried about being reelected to the board, they may attach great
importance to the level of shareholder support in a Say on Pay vote, and
therefore be quite willing to reduce compensation levels or eliminate
abusive pay practices if shareholders or proxy advisory firms ask them to
do so. 3 15 Finally, Say on Pay may improve communication between
shareholders and managers on compensation issues, which could result in a
general improvement of corporate governance. 3 16
a. Dodd-Frank Makes a Shareholder Say on Pay Vote Mandatory
In response to the financial crisis that began in 2007, Congress
enacted Dodd-Frank, including a provision that required public companies
to hold an advisory shareholder vote on the compensation of their top
executives. 317 Shareholders strongly supported existing pay practices at
most firms with Say on Pay votes in the 2011 proxy season, the inaugural
year for Say on Pay, with these proposals garnering on average 91.2
percent support. 318 These average support levels continued to be high in
subsequent years, with more than three-quarters of companies in the
Russell Index receiving at least 90 percent shareholder support in 2012 and
2013.319 At the other end of the spectrum, only 1-2 percent of firms (40 to
60 of the firms in the Russell 3000 index of U.S. stocks) received less than
50 percent shareholder support during these same years. 320
Professor of Law & Economics, Harvard Law School), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CHRG-11 1shrg55479/pdflCHRG-11 1shrg55479.pdf.
315. Fabrizio Ferri & David A. Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation:Evidence from
the U.K., 17 REV. FIN. 527, 531 (2013).
316. Id.
317. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
sec. 951, 124 Stat. 1375, 1899 (2010) (adding new section 14A to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934). See also Thomas, Palmiter & Cotter, supra note 4, at 1225 (discussing the phase-in of the
requirement based on the size of the company).
318. TED ALLEN ET AL., ISS, PRELIMINARY 2011 U.S. POSTSEASON REPORT 2 (updated Aug. 8,
2011), available at http://blog.issgovemance.com/docs/2011USSeasonPreview. Equilar, a leading
provider of data on executive pay, surveyed 2,252 companies from the Russell 3000 as of June 30,
2011, almost 75 percent of which passed their Say on Pay votes with over 90 percent approval.
EQUILAR, VOTING ANALYTICS: AN ANALYSIS OF VOTING RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE AT RUSSELL
3000 COMPANIES 1 (July 2011), available at http://www.equilar.com/knowledge-network/researcharticles/201 1/pdf/Equilar-Voting-Analytics-July2O1 .pdf. See also Say-on-Pay Support Runs High in
2013, With Few Exceptions, CORP. COUNS. WKLY. (BNA), June 6, 2013 (reporting a study by Meridian
Compensation Partners that found on average 90 percent of shareholders voted in favor of company Say
on Pay proposals, with only 2 percent of Russell 3000 companies receiving less than 50 percent
support); Cotter, Palmiter & Thomas, supra note 310, at 998-1001 (providing an in-depth discussion of
early 2012 say-on-pay voting results).
319. Say-on-Pay Support Runs High in 2013, With Few Exceptions, supra note 318; Cotter,
Palmiter & Thomas, supra note 310, at 1000.
320. Cotter, Palmiter & Thomas, supra note 310, at 999-1000; Say-on-Pay Support Runs High in
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What led shareholders to differentiate among companies in their
votes? One salient fact is that shareholder votes were highly correlated with
company share returns and CEO pay, with low returns and high CEO pay
resulting in lower Say on Pay support; excess compensation levels and poor
corporate performance were important triggers for negative stockholder
votes.3 2 1 Another important factor that influences shareholder voting is the
voting recommendation of proxy advisory firms such as ISS and Glass
Lewis. 322
b. Say On Pay Causes Changes to Compensation Practices
A key question is whether proxy advisory firms "mostly act as
information intermediaries by gathering and processing information for
institutional investors who need to fulfill their fiduciary duties to vote, or
[whether] they also identify and promote superior governance practices." 323
One study concludes that ISS and Glass Lewis are primarily information
gatherers, but that their recommendations are correlated with voting
results.3 24 In particular, it determines that negative recommendations by
either ISS or Glass Lewis had a substantial negative impact on Say on Pay
vote totals, with an ISS negative recommendation lowering the total by
24.7 percent and a Glass Lewis negative recommendation leading to a 12.9
2013, With Few Exceptions, supra, note 318. See also GEORGESON, REPORT: FACTS BEHIND 2013

FAILED SAY ON PAY VOTES (2013), available at http://www.computershare-na.com/sharedweb/
georgeson/georgeson report/GeorgesonReport 061113.pdf#1 ("In 2011, 36 U.S. corporations failed to
receive majority shareholder support for their MSOP proposal and in 2012 that number increased to 59.
Based on the YTD results for 2013, it seems that there could be fewer MSOP failures this year
compared to 2012."); Mary Hughes, Pay-for-PerformanceIs Still No.] Issue in Say-on-Pay Success, 16
CORP. GOVERNANCE REPORT (BNA) No. 85, Aug. 5, 2013 ("Say-on-pay statistics in 2013 showed that
77 percent of companies in the Russell 3000 index of U.S. stocks received at least 90 percent
shareholder support, compared to 76 percent in 2012 . . .. Only 43 companies, or 2.3 percent of Russell
3000 companies failed say-on-pay."). Some commentators claim that 67 percent support is a more
important threshold because "ballots that fail to gamer a two-thirds majority are an indication of
potential problems, especially since more than 90 percent of the votes analyzed passed with a
supermajority." RYAN KRAUSE, KIMBERLY A. WHITLER & MATTHEW SEMADENI, CONFERENCE BD.,
DIRECTOR NOTES: WHEN DO SHAREHOLDERS CARE ABOUT CEO PAY? 2 (2013).

321. Cotter, Palmiter & Thomas, supra note 310, at 998-1001. One experimental study found that
study participants were "significantly more likely to reject high CEO pay relative to low CEO pay only
if company performance was poor." KRAUSE, WHITLER & SEMANDI, supranote 320, at 3 (emphasis in
original). This suggests that poor performance is the trigger for shareholders to engage in closer
scrutiny of executive pay levels.
322. E.g., Cotter, Palmiter & Thomas, supra note 310, at 1001 ("ISS recommendations continue
to play a key role in the say-on-pay voting process.").
323. Ertimur, Ferri & Oesch, supra note 11, at 952.
324. First, the study detects a small but significantly negative mean abnormal return when ISS
issues an unexpected negative voting recommendation in a Say on Pay vote, which is consistent with it
performing an information gathering function. Id at 953.
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percent drop. The study also finds that 55 percent of the companies
receiving negative ISS voting recommendations reported compensation
plan changes in response to Say on Pay votes, and that their responsiveness
increased with the level of negative shareholder votes. However, the study
finds no stock market reaction to compensation changes made after the Say
on Pay vote. 325
A second study focusing on the impact of proxy advisory firms'
voting recommendations on Say on Pay votes examines changes that
companies made to their compensation programs before Say on Pay
votes. 326 It finds that third-party advisers can induce firms to adopt
compensation plans that they favor, or to reject certain types of plans that
they disfavor (such as tax gross-ups for change of control agreements).
However, the study detects a small, statistically significant negative stock
market reaction to plan changes "aligned" with ISS and Glass Lewis
policies, and no such change with compensation plan changes that are
"unrelated" to proxy adviser policies. 327 In sum, Say on Pay's impact on
pay practices at targeted firms may lead to small negative market
decreases-at least for the first year of Say on Pay-if firms adjust their
compensation practices in line with ISS's recommendations before holding
their first vote.
c. Impact of Say on Pay Votes on Firm Value
Several studies attempt to measure the effect of Say on Pay on firm
value. Vincente Cufiat, Mireia Gind, and Maria Guadalupe completed a
study on Rule 14a-8 advisory shareholder proposals from 2006-2010 that
request that companies permit their shareholders to vote on executive
compensation at the firm. 328 It examines the immediate effect on firm stock
market returns as well as longer term effects on CEO compensation,
accounting performance, productivity, and firm policies. It finds that on the
day of the shareholder vote, for Say on Pay proposals that receive more
than 50 percent shareholder approval, the company experiences a positive
abnormal return of 2.4 percent relative to ones that fail. 32 9 This study
reports that where voting crosses the 50 percent threshold, there is a 50
325. Id. at 953-55. The study also finds that 36 percent of companies that receive negative ISS
voting recommendations file additional documents with the SEC prior to the vote. Id. at 955 n.4.
326. David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall & Gaizka Ormazabal, OutsourcingShareholder Voting to
Proxy Advisory Firms 5 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 119, 2014),
availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-2101453.
327. Id. at 7-8.
328. Cuflat et al., Say Pays!, supra note 14, at 2.
329. Id. at 4.
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percent higher likelihood of the proposal being implemented by the firm in
question, and that firms implementing Say on Pay "have higher growth in
earnings per share, return on assets, return on equity and Tobin's Q one
year after the vote." 330 However, the study finds only small effects on
executive compensation, with a 4 percent reduction in salary increases. 331 It
suggests that Say on Pay "serves to monitor and incentivize CEOs to
deliver better firm performance by providing a clear mechanism for
shareholders to voice their opinions, as confirmed by major improvements
in shareholder value and firm performance among the firms in [the]
sample." 332
Another recent study by Peter Iliev and Svetla Vitanova examines the
announcement of the SEC rules that gave smaller firms an additional two
years before being subjected to the new Say on Pay requirement imposed
on larger public companies. 333 They find that the announcement of this rule
led to a positive 1.5 percent three-day return for firms that were exempt
from the new Say on Pay vote versus those that were not. 334 There are
similar findings as to the Congressional adoption of the legislation itself,
although there is not unanimity on this point.33 s
Similarly, another paper by Ricardo Correa and Ugur Lel analyzing
Say on Pay votes in the eleven countries that have enacted this kind of
legislation compares compensation levels and firm value in these countries
with those in twenty-seven countries that have not done so. 336 The authors
find a positive and statistically significant increase in firm value after the
adoption of Say on Pay laws in companies based in the eleven countries
that have adopted these laws. 337
330. Id. at 5.
331. Id
332. Id. at 5-6.
333. Peter Iliey & Svetla Vitanova, The Effect of the Say-on-Pay Vote in the U.S. 2 (Feb. 27,
2014), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2235064 (unpublished manuscript).
334. Id at 3.
335. Jie Cai & Ralph A. Walking, Shareholders' Say on Pay: Does it Create Value?, 46 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 299, 334-35 (2011) (finding positive and statistically significant stock price
increase in firm values at companies with high abnormal CEO compensation, or low pay-forperformance sensitivity, within the three days surrounding the House of Representatives' passage of
Say on Pay legislation). But see David F. Larcker, Gaizka Ormazabal & Daniel J. Taylor, The Market
Reaction To Corporate Governance Regulation, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 432 (2011) (finding that Say on
Pay legislation caused an insignificant market reaction).
336. Ricardo Correa & Ugur Lel, Say on Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, Pay Slice, and Firm
Value Around the World 2-3 (Apr. 2014), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=2243921 (unpublished manuscript).
337. Id. at 2-3. Correa and Lel also find that Say on Pay laws are associated with lower levels of
executive compensation, higher pay for performance sensitivity, and lower pay inequality between top
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d. Impact of Say on Pay Votes on Executive Compensation
In the United States, Say on Pay has not led to lower executive pay
levels or changes in its composition. While some proxy advisory firms
recommended that Say on Pay proposals be evaluated, in part to determine
whether inappropriate peer group "benchmarking" had led to the upward
spiral of executive pay, 338 shareholders seem to have largely ignored the
suggestion. 339 Prior research finds that Say on Pay had little or no impact
on executive compensation levels. 340 In the U.S., this trend continued into
the 2013 proxy season. 34 1 Research in the U.K. has also found that overall
CEO pay levels do not seem to have changed as a result of Say on Pay
votes. 34 2
However, Correa and Lel find that pay growth rates are lower in their
comparative study of eleven countries that have adopted Say on Pay
legislation. 343 Their cross-country study of thirty-eight nations-eleven that
have adopted Say on Pay and twenty-seven that have not done so-finds
that although "CEO compensation has increased in several [Say on Pay]
managers. Id.
338. Gretchen Morgenson, If Shareholders Say "Enough Already," the Board May Listen, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/business/shareholders-can-slow-theexecutive-pay-express.html (reporting that use of peer group benchmarking seems to contribute
"mightily" to growth of CEO pay by creating an "arms race in pay"). For further discussion of the effect
of peer group benchmarking on CEO pay levels and composition, see also John M. Bizjak, Michael L.
Lemmon & Lalitha Naveen, Does the Use ofPeer Groups Contribute to Higher Pay and Less Efficient
Compensation?, 90 J. FIN. EcON. 152, 166-67 (2008) (examining "the extent to which the use of peer
groups and competitive benchmarking process affects compensation," and finding that "the use of peer
groups is pervasive," and that this practice has "a nontrivial effect on the changes in pay of the CEO")
and Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Executive Superstars,Peer Groups, and Overcompensation:
Cause, Effect, and Solution, 38 J. CoRP. L. 487, 495-500 (2013) (describing the peer benchmarking
process and the problem with peer group analysis).
339. See Thomas, Palmiter & Cotter, supra note 4, at 1257 ("One thing that did not happen during
the 2011 proxy season, however, was a shareholder backlash at increasing levels of executive pay.").
340. Cuilat et al., Say Pays!, supra note 14, at 5. Compare Iliev & Vitanova, supra note 333, at 3
(finding that the introduction of Say on Pay votes increased the level of CEO pay by 14 percent).
341. Jesse Eisinger, In ShareholderSay-on-Pay Votes, More Whispers Than Shouts, N.Y. TIMES
(June 26, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/in-shareholder-say-on-pay-votesmore-whispers-than-shouts/ (reporting that executive pay levels continue to rise steadily even after the
implementation of Say on Pay). See also Gretchen Morgenson, An Unstoppable Climb in C.E.O. Pay,
N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/business/an-unstoppable-climb-inceo-pay.html (reporting that CEOs received a 16 percent median pay increase in 2012 over 2011 pay
levels).
342. Martin Conyon & Graham Sadler, Shareholder Voting and Directors'Remuneration Report
Legislation: Say on Pay in the U.K., 18 CORP. Gov.: INT'L REv. 296, 297 (2010) (finding no change in
the overall level of executive pay or its rate of growth subsequent to Say on Pay votes). See also Ferri &
Maber, supra note 315, at 555 (finding that firms did adjust contractual features and increase sensitivity
to pay for performance in response to negative vote outcomes).
343. Correa & Lel, supra note 336, at 15.
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countries including the United States and United Kingdom, the growth in
CEO pay is higher in countries that have not passed [Say on Pay] laws." 3 "
If their results are correct, it is hard to know whether the relative decline in
CEO pay levels reflects additional leverage for directors in negotiations
with CEOs or greater willingness of directors to stand up to CEOs because
of their fear of losing their jobs. These relative declines in executive
compensation levels may lead to improvements in firm value if they result
in more money going into shareholders' pockets.
e. Say on Pay's Effect on Corporate Governance
Say on Pay's introduction had a significant effect on American
corporate governance. 34 5 Dodd-Frank's mandated shareholder votes
focused directors on shareholders' concerns about executive pay, increased
shareholder participation in corporate governance, and opened lines of
communication between management and shareholders (and proxy
advisory firms) regarding executive compensation. 346 Beginning with the
U.S. experience, management at many companies made changes to the
substance and disclosure of their pay programs in an attempt to more
clearly align pay to performance.3 47 Many companies revised the content of
the compensation discussion and analysis filed with the annual meeting
proxy materials, while management at other companies whose pay
programs received negative Say on Pay recommendations by proxy
advisory firms connected with shareholders following an "against"
recommendation. 348
At some companies, management is becoming more responsive to
negative shareholder votes on pay policies. 349 For example, in 2013,
Infinera Corp., Hercules Offshore, Inc., and Chesapeake Energy responded
to failed Say on Pay votes by changing pay programs to eliminate
perceived poor pay practices and by improving proxy disclosures.so Such
344. Id. Figure 1 in Correa and Lel's study illustrates the gap between the two groups of countries.
Id. at 35.
345. See Thomas, Palmiter & Cotter, supra note 4, at 1256.
346. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC Commissioner: An
Inflection Point: The SEC and the Current Financial Reform Landscape at the Social Investment Forum
2011 Conference (June 10, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl2011/
spch06101 llaa.htm.
347.
MICHAEL LITIENBERG, FARZAD DAMANIA & JUSTIN NEIDIG, CONFERENCE BD., DIRECTOR
NOTES: A CLOSER LOOK AT NEGATIVE SAY-ON-PAY VOTES DURING THE 2011 PROXY SEASON 2 (July

2011), available at http://www.srz.com/A-Closer-Look-at-Negative-Say-on-Pay-Votes-During-the2011-Proxy-Season-07-26-201 1/.
348. Cotter, Palmiter & Thomas, supra note 310, at 994, 998-1001.
349. Thomas, Palmiter & Cotter, supra note 4, at 1260.
350. Hughes, supra note 320.
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actions frequently result in significantly more shareholder support for the
revised pay policies in the following year. However, unless these changes
are tied to improvements in long-run firm value, they would not support
having a shareholder vote on executive compensation.
f. Summary
The empirical evidence summarized above supports the general claim
that Say on Pay votes improve firm value, reduce relative levels of
executive compensation, and improve corporate governance,35 ' although
there is one study that finds small negative market reactions to changes in
compensation policies implemented prior to the first Say on Pay vote. 352
Under our theory, if Say on Pay leads to increases in firm value, such a
result would support having these votes to monitor firm executive
compensation practices. Excess managerial compensation is an indicator
that the board of directors of the company is overpaying the company's
CEO compared to the level of expected pay for a company with its
characteristics, and may indicate weak corporate governance at the firm.
Similarly, persistent poor relative performance, usually measured by a
three-year total average shareholder return comparison with peer firms,
may indicate bad management, and therefore a weakness in the board of
directors' oversight of the CEO, or poor alignment of pay and performance
at the firm. A failed Say on Pay vote will signal to the board of directors
that they need to pay more attention to these issues, and may even signal to
hedge funds that the firm is a good target.3 53
CONCLUSION
Theoretical and real world developments have rendered existing
theories of corporate voting outdated and inaccurate. This Article develops
a new theoretical model for shareholder voting that takes these important
changes into account. We argue that shareholders, and only shareholders,
should have the vote, and that they should be asked to vote in a number of
different settings. While this view is subject to several important criticisms,
we show government intervention has provided shareholders with
incentives to vote, and that institutions facing significant conflicts of
351. Cuflat et al., Say Pays!, supra note 14, at 4-6; Iliev & Vitanova, supra note 333, at 2-3; Cai
& Walking, supra note 335, at 334-35.
352. Larcker, McCall & Ormazabal, supra note 326, at 40.
353. "An intriguing consequence of a failed [Say on Pay] vote is that, while shareholders may be
attempting to signal their displeasure with the CEO and the compensation committee, the failure may
have repercussions well beyond CEO compensation." KRAUSE, WHITLER & SEMANDI, supra note 320,
at 5.
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interest in voting can adopt policies to remedy those problems. Finally, we
apply our theory in two critical contemporary settings-hedge fund
activism and Say on Pay-to demonstrate why shareholder voting should
be required in both of them.

